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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Raw and partially treated sewage from Mexico continues to flow from 
the Tijuana River and into the San Diego region with no immediate end 
in sight.  This decades-old problem1 persists despite numerous international 
agreements between Mexico and the United States aimed at resolving it,2 
the spending of hundreds of millions of dollars on treatment and 
conveyance facilities,3 and the passing of legislation intended to provide 
a comprehensive, binational solution.4  At first glance, reaching the basic 
goals of treating the sewage and eliminating the risks to human health 
seems simple.  However, diplomatic, technological, political, and legal 
disputes have resulted from every effort to resolve the issue.5  Such 
disputes have delayed progress and have ultimately prevented the 
implementation of an effective solution.6 
 
 1. Untreated sewage from the Tijuana region has flowed into the Pacific Ocean 
since the late 1920s.  At that time Tijuana was approaching a population of approximately 
5000 people.  Then the city installed its first public sewerage system, which consisted of 
a small collection system and septic tank that primarily served the downtown region.  
The effluent from this tank was discharged through a dry wash into the Tijuana River, 
ultimately emptying into the Pacific Ocean.  JON JAMIESON, RAW SEWAGE TO RECLAIMED 
WATER: THE HISTORY OF SEWERAGE SYSTEMS IN THE METROPOLITAN SAN DIEGO—
TIJUANA REGION 26 (2002). The following definitions of effluent are illustrative for 
purposes of this Comment: (1) “A discharge of pollutants into the environment, partially 
or completely treated or in its natural state.  Generally used in regard to discharges into 
waters.”  (2) “Municipal sewage or industrial liquid waste (untreated, partially treated, or 
completely treated) that flows out of a treatment plant, septic system, pipe, etc.”  U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Terminology Reference System, at http://oaspub.epa.gov/trs/trs_ 
proc_qry.navigate_term?p_term_id=171&p_term_cd=TERM (last updated Mar. 31, 2003). 
 2. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 3. For instance, approximately $184 million was spent by the United States 
International Boundary and Water Commission (USIBWC) on the construction of the 
South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant (IWTP).  JAMIESON, supra note 1, 
at 160.  The IWTP, which began operations in April 1997, was specifically built to help 
alleviate cross-border sewage problems, but was only designed to treat sewage to 
advanced primary levels.  Id. at 160–61.  For a definition of advanced primary treatment, 
see infra note 67.  Construction of the South Bay Ocean Outfall (SBOO) came at a price 
of $160 million, a cost shared by the USIBWC and the city of San Diego.  JAMIESON, 
supra note 1, at 180.  The SBOO is a large pipe that runs beneath the ocean floor and 
eventually discharges effluent from the IWTP into the Pacific Ocean.  The IWTP and the 
SBOO are collectively referred to as the publicly owned treatment works.  These 
facilities are discussed at length in this paper.  For further discussion of the IWTP, see 
infra text accompanying note 59–68.  For further discussion of the SBOO, see infra Part II.A. 
 4. See Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act of 2000, 22 
U.S.C. § 277d-43 (2000). 
 5. For a discussion of various wastewater treatment technologies, as well as debates 
over which technology should be implemented in treating cross-border sewage, see infra Parts 
II.B, III.  Legal disputes are discussed in Parts II and IV.  For political disputes, see infra Part VI. 
 6. Professor John Minan of the University of San Diego School of Law recently 
addressed this issue.  See John H. Minan, Recent Developments in Wastewater Management 
in the Coastal Region at the United States-Mexico Border, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 51 
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In the meantime, the Tijuana region generates approximately fifty 
million gallons of sewage per day (mgd),7 an increase of forty-five mgd 
since the late 1950s.8  This drastic increase in sewage production is in 
large part due to the rapid population and economic growth that Tijuana 
has experienced over the past few decades.9 
A.  Population Growth and Maquiladora Expansion 
The massive growth of Mexican border cities can be traced back to the 
early 1940s.10  The onset of World War II resulted in farm labor 
shortages throughout the western and southwestern United States.11  The 
Bracero program12 was developed by the U.S. and Mexican governments 
to fill this shortage “by allowing large numbers of Mexican nationals to 
migrate to the United States to engage in seasonal agricultural 
employment.”13  Although it has been largely ignored, this Mexican labor 
 
(2002).  Professor Minan examines the Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Cleanup 
Act of 2000, California’s lawsuit against the USIBWC, and the Bajagua project.  Id. at 
66–80.  Professor Minan’s conclusions are cited and discussed throughout this 
Comment.  For further information about Professor Minan, see infra note 253. 
 7. Minan, supra note 6, at 52.  This is a conservative estimate.  Other sources 
indicate that the Tijuana Region generates as much as seventy million gallons of sewage 
per day.  Addressing Sewage Treatment in the San Diego-Tijuana Border Region: 
Implementation of Title VIII of P.L. 106-457: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water 
Res. and Env’t of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Congressman Duncan Hunter). 
 8. JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 111. 
 9. Demographic information reported by a division of the United Nations which 
provides population estimates in five-year increments indicates that Tijuana’s population 
nearly doubled from 1990 to 2000.  The population in 1990 was 761,000; by 2000 it had 
increased to 1,297,000.  POPULATION DIVISION, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD URBANIZATION 
PROSPECTS: THE 2001 REVISION 262 (2002). 
 10. See PETER N. KIRSTEIN, ANGLO OVER BRACERO: A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN 
WORKER IN THE UNITED STATES FROM ROOSEVELT TO NIXON 12–13 (1977). 
 11. Id. at 12–13.  Farm labor supply was reduced in part by the passage of the 
Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 and manpower requirements of the armed 
services.  Id. at 12.  The allure of higher paying and more stable jobs in the defense 
industry was also a contributing factor.  Id. 
 12. “Bracero” means “day-laborer” in Spanish.  George C. Kiser & Martha Woody 
Kiser, Introduction to MEXICAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (George C. Kiser & Martha Woody Kiser eds., 1979).  It 
comes from “brazos,” the Spanish word for arms, and conveys the idea of hiring men 
who use their arms in performing physical labor.  Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol 
Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human Rights, 2 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J 1, 13 n.33 (2001). 
 13. Christopher P. Brown & Stephen Mumme, Applied and Theoretical Aspects of 
Binational Watershed Councils (Consejos de Cuencas) in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 40 
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support was significant in contributing to the Allied victory.14 
However, by the early 1960s the Bracero program began to conflict 
with U.S. foreign policy.  President Kennedy openly criticized the 
program for “adversely affecting the wages, working conditions and 
employment opportunities of our own agricultural workers.”15  President 
Johnson agreed16 and unilaterally terminated the program in 1964.17 
Despite the program’s cancellation, thousands of Mexican workers 
continued to flow towards the border believing that they would, as had 
been the case for over two decades, be hired by U.S. employers.18  When 
this did not occur, the populations of Mexican border cities such as 
Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Reynosa dramatically 
increased.19 
The primary concern for Mexican policymakers at that point was to 
create new jobs within Mexico in order to offset the loss of Bracero 
jobs.20  Accordingly, Mexico implemented the National Border Development 
 
NAT. RESOURCES J., 895, 897 (2000).  The sudden entry of the United States into the war 
after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941 convinced many U.S. officials 
that the labor shortage was a serious problem.  KIRSTEIN, supra note 10, at 13.  As such, the 
United States entered into negotiations with Mexico to devise a plan for the importation of 
Mexican labor.  Id.  While Mexico was initially skeptical of the idea because of the long 
history of exploitation of Mexican laborers by American employers under previous 
programs, the two countries eventually reached agreement in 1942.  George C. Kiser & 
Martha Woody Kiser, Editors’ Introduction to MEXICAN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 67, 67–68. 
 14. Vargas, supra note 12, at 13.  As U.S. nationals returned home after the war, 
millions of braceros and their families were deported back to Mexico.  Id. at 14.  Even 
so, various economic conditions, grower concerns, and the outbreak of the Korean 
conflict enabled the program to continue through the 1950s.  Kiser & Kiser, supra note 
13, at 69.  Over the program’s twenty-two-year lifetime, more than 4.5 million Mexican 
workers were brought to the United States for temporary employment.  Id. at 67. 
 15. KIRSTEIN, supra note 10, at 104. 
 16. Kiser & Kiser, supra note 13, at 69. 
 17. Vargas, supra note 12, at 15–16.  Ironically, this resulted in an even greater 
reliance on Mexican labor, as the number of illegal Mexican workers entering the United 
States skyrocketed.  Kiser & Kiser, supra note 13, at 69.  The Ambassador of Mexico 
had warned this would happen: 
[T]he absence of an [international labor] agreement would not end the problem 
but rather would give rise to . . . [t]he illegal introduction of Mexican workers 
into the United States, which would be extremely prejudicial to the illegal 
workers and . . . would also unfavorably affect American workers, which is 
precisely what the legislators of the United States are trying to prevent. 
Mexican Embassy, Why the Bracero Program Should Not Be Terminated, in MEXICAN 
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 
12, at 120–21. 
 18. Vargas, supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 19. Id. at 16.  Unfortunately, this in turn caused extreme shortages of food, water, 
shelter, and transportation in the affected border cities.  Id. 
 20. George C. Kiser & Martha Woody Kiser, Editors’ Introduction to MEXICAN 
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 
12, at 257, 257; see also Manuel García y Griego, The Importation of Mexican Contract 
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Program (Programa Nacional Fronterizo or PRONAF),21 which 
encouraged foreign-owned corporations, primarily from the United 
States, to operate manufacturing assembly plants on Mexican soil.22 
Since PRONAF’s inception, these plants, known as maquiladoras,23 
have spread along the U.S.-Mexico border, including into Tijuana.24  
The problem with maquiladora expansion has been two-fold.  First, there 
is an increase in organic waste associated with accompanying population 
increases.25  Second, a substantial amount of industrial waste is 
generated from the factories themselves, which can cause additional 
stress on Tijuana sewage treatment facilities.26 
B.   Tijuana’s Sewage Infrastructure 
Due primarily to a lack of financial resources, the city of Tijuana has 
had difficulties keeping up with the demands of its population growth.27  
 
Laborers to the United States, 1942–1964: Antecedents, Operation, and Legacy, in THE 
BORDER THAT JOINS: MEXICAN MIGRANTS AND U.S. RESPONSIBILITY 49, 77 (Peter G. 
Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1983) (stating that the termination of the labor program 
prompted Mexican policymakers to create new employment opportunities). 
 21. Vargas, supra note 12, at 16.  The program is also referred to as the Border 
Industrialization Program.  Kiser & Kiser, supra note 20, at 257. 
 22. Kiser & Kiser, supra note 20, at 257.  Implementation of PRONAF appears to 
have been a drastic measure.  It received criticism from within Mexico as an 
abandonment of attempts to control direct foreign investment and limit foreigner-owned 
land.  Griego, supra note 20, at 77.  “That Mexican political elites would knowingly 
embark upon such a program is in part a reflection of how seriously they viewed the 
elimination of the safety valve afforded by the labor program.”  Id. 
 23. Maquiladora reflects the Spanish word “maquila,” which is the portion of flour 
retained by a miller as payment for grinding a client’s grain.  Brown & Mumme, supra 
note 13, at 897 n.11. 
 24. For example, in the early 1970s there were approximately 290 businesses 
associated with PRONAF along the border, with a total employment of about 31,000.  
117 CONG. REC. 39,454 (1971).  By 1998, however, Tijuana alone had more than 2500 
businesses associated with international trade incentives.  JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 
173.  The city experienced a 1000% increase in maquila-related employment from 1970 
to 1988, with total employment estimated at 100,000 in 2000.  Brown & Mumme, supra note 
13, at 898.  Reports suggest that trends of industrialization will continue, as employment 
numbers are projected to increase to between 500,000 and 720,000 by 2025.  Id. 
 25. JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 45, 173. 
 26. Id. 
 27. For instance, in 1961 the city of Tijuana postponed construction of a canal and 
stabilization ponds near Rosarito due to a lack of funds.  As a result, raw sewage was 
discharged into the Arroyo San Antonio de los Buenos and, ultimately, the Pacific Ocean 
about five miles south of the border.  Id. at 72–73.  Another example occurred in 1972 
when plans for a tertiary treatment facility to be constructed three miles south of the 
border had to be postponed for the same reason.  Id. at 95.  One last example can be seen 
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Recent studies indicate that only about eighty-five percent of Tijuana’s 
population is connected to the existing sewer system.28  Furthermore, 
Tijuana’s current sewer system often fails, causing massive amounts of 
untreated sewage to flow into the Tijuana River, which eventually 
causes beach closures29 and advisories30 from Imperial Beach to 
 
in the cancellation of an extensive two-staged 1975 project that would have ultimately 
treated sewage for irrigation and industrial purposes.  Id. at 100.  By comparison, a $46.4 
million loan provided by the Inter-American Development Bank allowed the city of 
Tijuana to move forward with the Integrated Project, which significantly rehabilitated 
and improved Tijuana’s sewerage infrastructure in the mid-1980s.  Id. at 120–21.  
Ironically, during the plant’s opening ceremonies, it was announced that these 
improvements “would guarantee that San Diego beaches would never be closed again 
because of Mexican sewage.”  Id. at 128. 
 28. Dean J. Gibson & Ana Maria Lemus, San Diego State Univ. Inst. for Reg’l 
Studies of the Californias, Map 5: Sewage Infrastructure, in SAN DIEGO-TIJUANA 
INTERNATIONAL BORDER AREA PLANNING ATLAS 17, 17 (2000), available at http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/~irsc/atlas/text/seweng.html.  Tijuana’s sewage system initially relies on a 
series of small sewage collectors in the central and eastern portions of the city.  These 
connect to two main collectors: Ponente 1st etapa (West Interceptor) and Orente 1st 
etapa (East Interceptor).  The sewage is then channeled into a single reinforced concrete 
conveyer to Pump Station 1, which is located near the U.S.-Mexico border.  The pump 
was placed at the area’s low point so that gravity would propel sewage to the pump.  The 
sewage is then pumped to a concrete conveyance canal linked to the treatment facility at 
San Antonio de los Buenos, which was constructed in 1987.  There are two smaller 
pump stations in the western canyons that collect sewage from communities that are not 
hooked up to the main collection areas.  Playas de Tijuana, a community to the west of 
Tijuana, also pumps sewage to San Antonio de los Buenos.  JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 128–31. 
 29. A closure occurs when a sign placed at a public beach informs the public that 
the area is closed to swimming or water contact because of water contamination.  
Closures result from reported sewage spills that impact, or may impact, water quality at 
a public beach.  SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEP’T OF ENVTL. HEALTH, SAN DIEGO COUNTY 
BEACH CLOSURES AND ADVISORIES IN 2002, at 1 (2002), http://www.co.san-diego. 
ca.us/deh/lwq/beachbay/pdf/2002_beach_closure_advisory_sum.pdf [hereinafter CLOSURES 
AND ADVISORIES].  There were 129 sewage spills in San Diego County from 2000 to 
2002, resulting in 522 days of beach closures.  SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
HEALTH, SAN DIEGO COUNTY BEACH CLOSURE REPORT: 3 YEAR SUMMARY 1 (2000–2002), 
http://www.co.san-diego.ca.us/deh/lwq/beachbay/pdf/3_yr_sum_00-02a.pdf (2002) [hereinafter 
3 YEAR SUMMARY].  These figures do not include sample results from “chronic” locations 
where the “presence of known on-going sources of contamination require[s] signs to 
remain posted . . . to protect public health.”  Id.  The San Diego County Department of 
Environmental Health designated the shoreline at the outlet of the Tijuana River 
chronically contaminated due to ongoing sewage contamination.  CLOSURES AND ADVISORIES, 
supra note 29, at 1 n.1.  In 2002, San Diego County led California in the total number of 
sewage spills as well as in the total volume of sewage spilled.  HEAL THE BAY, 13TH 
ANNUAL BEACH REPORT CARD 3 (2003), available at  http://www.healthebay.org/brc/annual/ 
2003/pdfdocs/fullreport.pdf. 
 30. “An advisory or warning is the placement of signs at a public beach that warns 
the public against swimming and/or water contact due to the increased risk of illness.  An 
advisory/warning is the consequence of bacteria levels in monitoring results exceeding 
State standards.”  CLOSURES AND ADVISORIES, supra note 29, at 1.  While the source of 
the bacteria is usually unknown, it may include animal and human feces, soils, and 
decaying plant matter.  Id.  Animal and human wastes often enter coastal waters via 
sewer overflows, discharges of untreated or partially treated wastes from sewage-
treatment plants and sanitary sewers, septic system failures, and stormwater runoff from 
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Coronado.31  For instance, in April 2002, sewage spilled into the Tijuana 
River on three different occasions, closing beaches in Imperial Beach for 
nine days.32  The problem has become so pervasive that since 1993 the 
city of San Diego “has continuously declared a local emergency 
regarding the escalated discharge of sewage across the international 
border.”33 
 
urban, suburban, and rural areas.  MARK DORFMAN, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, TESTING 
THE WATER 2002: A GUIDE TO WATER QUALITY AT VACATION BEACHES 1 (2000).  
Pursuant to state law, the California Department of Health Services (DHS) promulgated 
monitoring requirements for total coliform, fecal coliform, and enterococcus bacteria.  
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 115880(c)(2) (West Supp. 2003); see CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 17, § 7958 (2003).  There were 542 bacterial exceedance advisories in San Diego 
County from 2000 to 2002, resulting in 3392 days under advisory.  See 3 YEAR SUMMARY, 
supra note 29, at 1.  For a further discussion of San Diego County’s beach monitoring 
program, see infra note 34. 
 31. For recent data on these discharges, see sources cited supra note 29.  An earlier 
example occurred in late 1984 when heavy rains eventually led to the spilling of 3.5 
million gallons of sewage.  Beaches extending from the border north to Coronado were 
quarantined by the San Diego County Department of Environmental Health.  JAMIESON, 
supra note 1, at 117.  Another example occurred in 1980, also due to heavy rainfall.  
Floods caused extensive damage to Tijuana’s sewage infrastructure and approximately 
twenty-two million gallons of raw sewage flowed into the Tijuana River.  Beaches from 
the border to Silver Strand were quarantined throughout the summer.  Id. at 111.  The 
city of Imperial Beach borders Mexico.  National City is directly north, followed by 
Coronado.  For a map of these cities, the South Bay generally, and the locations of the 
various treatment plants discussed in this Comment, see AGUA CLARA LLC, BAJAGUA 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND WATER RECLAMATION PROJECT, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION DOCUMENT 1-11 fig.1.1 (1999). 
 32. SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEP’T OF ENVTL. HEALTH, SAN DIEGO COUNTY 2002 
BEACH CLOSURE & ADVISORY REPORT 2 (2002), available at http://www.co.san-
diego.ca.us/deh/lwq/beachbay/pdf/2002a_beach_closure_advisory_report.pdf (indicating 
that approximately 10.5 million gallons of sewage spilled into the Tijuana River as a 
result of the first spill, approximately 80,000 gallons of sewage leaked from a broken 
pipe during the second spill, and an unknown amount of sewage flowed into the Tijuana 
River during the third spill). 
 33. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, RESOLUTION NO. R-295986: RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF 
SAN DIEGO ENDORSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PRIVATELY FUNDED MEXICAN FACILITY 
FOR SECONDARY TREATMENT OF EFFLUENT FROM THE SOUTH BAY INTERNATIONAL 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 1 (adopted Jan. 22, 2002).  In response to the current 
crisis and in anticipation of its continued growth, the U.S. EPA and the Comision Estatal 
de Servicios Publicos de Tijuana (CESPT) began a comprehensive study known as the 
Tijuana and Playas de Rosarito Potable Water and Wastewater Master Plan.  This study 
is intended to develop an integrated strategy to improve potable water services, 
wastewater collection, and wastewater sanitation in the border region.  See CAMP 
DRESSER & MCKEE, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, DRAFT TIJUANA AND PLAYAS DE 
ROSARITO POTABLE WATER AND WASTEWATER MASTER PLAN 1-2 (2003).  This strategy 
will play a critical role in resolving the current and future Tijuana-San Diego sewage 
crisis.  However, because of the sheer magnitude of cross-border sewage problems, the 
study is outside the scope of this Comment. 
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C.  Sewage Impacts 
While San Diego’s beach monitoring program34 provides some public 
notice of contamination, it by no means guarantees public safety.35  
People who engage in recreational activities in sewage-contaminated 
water are at risk of contracting a number of infectious illnesses and 
diseases.36  In addition, the sewage spills have had a direct adverse 
 
 34. Current federal law does not require states to administer monitoring programs 
or notify the public when water quality standards are violated.  Accordingly, there is a 
great deal of variation in testing procedures and beach closure standards among the state 
and local governments that do conduct monitoring.  DORFMAN, supra note 30, at 29, 33. 
The Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health Act of 2000 will change this 
by requiring states to adopt uniform water quality and performance standards established 
by the EPA by April 10, 2004.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(i)(1)(A) (2000).  In addition, the Act 
authorizes the EPA to award program grants to aid states, territories, and other 
municipalities in the development of monitoring programs.  Id. § 1346(b).  California did 
not have mandatory testing programs for its beaches until 1997.  DORFMAN, supra note 30, 
at 33.  Since that time, the state’s beach monitoring and safety programs have been 
further developed by the Clean Beaches Initiative and passage of Assembly Bills 411 
and 1946 (both now codified in the California Health and Safety Code).  Id. at 24.  One 
provision of AB 411 mandates that water samples “be conducted on at least a weekly 
basis, from April 1 to October 31,” at beaches that are both (1) visited by more that 
50,000 people annually and (2) located near a storm drain that flows in the summer.  
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 115880 (4)(A)(B) (West Supp. 2003).  This time period 
is sometimes referred to as AB 411.  HEAL THE BAY, supra note 29, at 2.  While AB 411 
is a step in the right direction, those who are active in the ocean during the winter or at 
less frequented beaches during the summer still receive inadequate warning and 
protection.  This is the case in San Diego County.  During AB 411, the San Diego 
County Department of Environmental Health (DEH), in conjunction with five other local 
wastewater authorities, collects weekly water samples from more than 110 shoreline 
locations.  San Diego County Department of Environmental Health, Recreational Water 
Monitoring Program, at http://www.co.sandiego.ca.us/deh/lwq/beachbay/rech20monitor.html 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Water Monitoring Program].  However, during 
the winter, DEH reduces the monitoring program by about seventy-two percent, and 
beaches in the northern portion of the county do not receive timely information.  HEAL THE 
BAY, supra note 29, at 2.  Fortunately, the majority of the problematic beaches in southern 
San Diego are still monitored during the winter.  Id. 
 35. For one, the public does not always heed posted warning signs.  Vandals may 
also remove signs, leaving beaches temporarily without posted warnings.  DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. HEALTH, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO: OCEAN ILLNESS 
SURVEY RESULTS, AUGUST 1997–DECEMBER 1999, at 10 (2000).  Also, beach monitoring 
programs do not directly test for the presence of viruses because current testing methods are 
either prohibitively expensive or logistically infeasible.  HEAL THE BAY, supra note 29, at 1. 
 36. Polluted waters contain several disease-causing organisms called pathogens.  
DORFMAN, supra note 30, at 33.  Pathogens present in sewage include various bacteria, 
viruses, protozoa, and worms.  OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BEFORE 
YOU GO TO THE BEACH . . . 2 (1997), available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/ 
pdf/epa_beachbro.pdf.  Bacterial pathogens can cause gastroenteritis, typhoid fever, 
septicemia (infections in the bloodstream), dysentery and cholera.  Water Monitoring 
Program, supra note 34.  Diseases associated with viral pathogens include gastroenteritis, 
severe respiratory disease, fever, rashes, paralysis, aseptic meningitis myocarditis, 
respiratory and gastrointestinal infection, and infectious hepatitis (liver malfunction).  Id.  
Protozoa can cause cryptosporidiosis and giardiasis (including diarrhea and abdominal 
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impact on San Diego’s tourism industry37 and on the Tijuana River 
estuary, a national estuarine research reserve.38  The San Diego County 
Department of Environmental Health considers the estuary’s shoreline 
chronically contaminated due to ongoing sewage discharges.39 
The problems associated with these adverse impacts begin with 
Tijuana’s elevated position relative to San Diego.  The Tijuana River 
flows naturally downward from Tijuana and across the border.40  It then 
passes through the Tijuana River estuary and into the Pacific Ocean.  
Perhaps more importantly, near-shore ocean currents aid in bringing the 
effluent northward during the winter and spring seasons.41  Sewage can 
also be carried into the San Diego region during summer months by the 
energy produced from southern hemisphere storms. 42  These currents play 
 
cramps), and dysentery.  OFFICE OF WATER, supra, at 2.  Worms are associated with digestive 
disturbances, vomiting, relentless coughing, chest pain, fever, and diarrhea.  Id.  
“Gastroenteritis, which can also be caused by bacteria, is a common term for a variety of 
diseases that can cause symptoms such as vomiting, diarrhea, stomach ache, nausea, 
headache, and fever.”  DORFMAN, supra note 30, at 5.  Even those that do not go to the 
beach may contract illnesses by eating contaminated seafood.  However, harmful 
biological pathogens are generally eliminated when seafood is properly cooked.  Thus, 
health concerns relating to sewage contamination generally only arise in the consumption of 
raw seafood.  Telephone Interview with Robert Romaine, Senior Environmental Health 
Specialist, Department of Environmental Health, San Diego County (June 12, 2003). 
 37. JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 153–54.  The significance of this threat becomes 
apparent in looking at California’s general dependence on tourism.  Tourist expenditures 
in the state’s coastal counties in 1997 were approximately $37.6 billion, providing 
387,530 jobs.  DORFMAN, supra note 30, at 9.  A 1999 study conducted by the Public 
Research Institute of San Francisco State University estimated the total economic impact 
that visits to California beaches have on the national economy.  The study indicates that 
in 1998, the employment created by tourism at California’s beaches generated $63 
billion in revenue.  PHILIP KING, S.F. STATE UNIV., THE FISCAL IMPACT OF BEACHES IN 
CALIFORNIA 9, 11 tbl.1.8 (1999).  Further, after calculating total direct, indirect, and 
induced employment, the study found that California’s beaches created over 880,000 
jobs nationally in 1998.  Id. at 9, 11 tbl.1.8. 
 38. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & INT’L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N, FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER 
COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT AND OUTFALL FACILITIES 
S-1 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL EIS].  Human and industrial wastewater has an especially 
adverse impact on the estuary because it dilutes salinity levels to the extent that 
indigenous species find the waters inhospitable.  John Altomare, Comment, Stemming 
the Flow: The Role of International Environmental Law in Seeking a Solution to the 
Sewage Treatment Crisis at the Tijuana-San Diego Border Region, 21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
361, 365 (1990). 
 39. CLOSURES AND ADVISORIES, supra note 29, at 1 n.1. 
 40. Minan, supra note 6, at 53. 
 41. Id. at 56. 
 42. E-mail from Clay Clifton, Department of Environmental Health, Land & 
Water Quality Division, County of San Diego, to Author (June 30, 2003) (on file with 
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a major role in creating hazards to human health and in closing San Diego 
area beaches. 
At this point, it is certain that, in the near future, untreated and 
partially treated sewage discharged from Tijuana will continue to pose 
increased threats to human health, the environment, and the economy on 
both sides of the border.43  As a result, there is an urgent need for a 
comprehensive solution to this sewage crisis.  This solution must include 
the construction of a secondary treatment facility with the capability to 
treat as much sewage as possible and not only what is required under 
current bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico.44 
D.  A Preview of the Solution 
In passing the Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup 
Act of 2000 (Tijuana River Act),45 Congress has established a foundation 
for the most comprehensive solution to date.  The Act calls for the 
construction of a privately funded secondary treatment46 facility built on 
Mexican soil.47  Under the Act, the United States federal government, 
acting by way of the U.S. International Boundary and Water 
Commission (USIBWC),48 is to enter into a twenty-year fee-for-services 
contract with the owner of the Mexican facility.49  The Act represents a 
significant change in policy50 regarding the sewage issue.  Previous 
efforts to resolve the problem had focused on improving treatment 
capabilities at the existing International Wastewater Treatment Plant 
(IWTP),51 which is a facility located just north of the international 
 
author) (explaining that while current information is limited, ocean monitoring data, 
satellite images, and lifeguard reports indicate that south swells can transport effluent 
plumes from Mexico into the United States). 
 43. This is inevitable considering that the population of Tijuana is expected to 
increase from 1.3 million in 2000 to nearly 1.8 million by 2010.  POPULATION DIVISION, 
supra note 9, at 262.  For a discussion of the health risks and adverse economic impact 
of sewage-contaminated water, see supra notes 36–37. 
 44. Pursuant to an international agreement with Mexico, the U.S. federal 
government has committed to treat twenty-five mgd of sewage to secondary levels at a 
treatment facility on the U.S. side of the border.  Minute No. 283 of the International 
Boundary and Water Commission: Conceptual Plan for the International Solution to the 
Border Sanitation Problem in San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California, July 2, 
1990, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 11735, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/minutes/ 
minute283.pdf  [hereinafter Minute 283]. 
 45. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44 (2000). 
 46. For a definition of secondary treatment, see infra note 61. 
 47. § 277d-44(a)(1). 
 48. For a discussion of the USIBWC, see infra note 63. 
 49. § 277d-44(c). 
 50. Minan, supra note 6, at 69–70. 
 51. See  AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at S-3 (indicating that the IWTP is located 
on the northern side of the U.S.-Mexico border); see also Memorandum of Points and 
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border and owned and operated by the USIBWC.52 
This Comment will argue for the implementation of a Mexico-based 
treatment facility as required by the Tijuana River Act.  As will be 
shown, current treatment facilities are wholly inadequate.  The IWTP 
consistently fails to meet state and federal water quality standards, and 
the treatment site cannot account for Tijuana’s future population growth. 
Currently, the only proposal that meets the provisions of the Tijuana 
River Act is the Bajagua project.53  This project is the superior alternative 
for a number of key reasons.  However, these benefits are best 
understood after examining the alternatives, as well as the developments 
that have led to the current legal and political deadlock.  These developments 
and alternatives are discussed in Part II.  An in-depth analysis of the 
Bajagua project will follow in Part III.  For now, it is necessary to note 
that the Bajagua project calls for the construction of a privately funded 
fifty mgd secondary treatment plant in Mexico.54  This facility will account 
for the future growth of the Tijuana region and the accompanying 
increase in sewage production.  Furthermore, it will also be capable of 
providing more advanced treatment for purposes of water reclamation. 
Parts IV and V will explain the legal hurdles that must be overcome in 
implementing the Bajagua project.  Logically divided into two 
subdivisions, the first category of hurdles stems from the fact that 
construction of a treatment facility in Mexico requires either the 
negotiation of a new binational agreement or the amendment of an 
existing agreement with the Mexican government.  The USIBWC, the 
federal agency responsible for entering into international agreements 
with Mexico, has vehemently resisted such negotiations.  Thus, the 
arguments made by the USIBWC in this respect must be dealt with and 
overcome.  These arguments include the Competition in Contracting 
Act’s mandates against sole sourcing, the claim that there is a lack of 
Mexican support for the project, and the claim that there is a lack of 
funding to initiate both preliminary studies and the Bajagua project itself.55 
 
Authorities in Support of Motion of the People of the State of California for Entry of Proposed 
Consent Decree at 1, Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-
CV-2441) (indicating that the USIBWC operates a sewage treatment facility at the IWTP). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Minan, supra note 6, at 70. 
 54. AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-17. 
 55. See 41 U.S.C. § 253 (2000) (generally requiring that executive agencies obtain 
open competition when contracting for property or services); USIBWC’s Response to 
Second Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Allow Agua Clara LLC to 
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The second subdivision of legal problems stems from the foundational 
tenets of our legal system, specifically the separation of powers doctrine 
and the recognition of sovereign immunity. 
Finally, it should be noted that while sewage discharged from San 
Diego-based treatment facilities clearly contributes to the region’s water 
quality and environmental health problems,56 discussion of these 
discharges is outside the scope of this Comment. 
II.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
Mexico and the United States realized the severity of cross-border 
sewage problems decades ago.  Accordingly, the two nations entered 
into a number of international agreements aimed at resolving the 
dilemma.57  One of the most significant of these agreements, Minute 
283, was signed in July 1990.58  Under Minute 283, Mexico and the 
United States agreed to build an international treatment facility in the 
United States, just north of the international border.59  The United States 
 
Participate Amicus Curiae and Opposition of USIBWC to Request for Judicial Notice 
Regarding Second Supplemental Brief at 4, 6, Ramirez (No. 99-CV-2441) (arguing that 
(1) the Tijuana River Act “cannot be construed as legislative authority for the USIBWC 
to sole-source” the fee-for-services contract, and (2) Mexico is not a Bajagua project 
supporter); see also sources cited infra notes 214, 239 (indicating that the USIBWC 
contends it is unable to negotiate treaty minute negotiations and implement the Tijuana 
River Act because of a lack of congressional funding). 
 56. For statistics regarding San Diego-based sewage discharges, see San Diego 
Environmental Protection Agency, Sewage Spill Data, at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/ 
rwqcb9/programs/sso/sso%20data.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 57. For a description of minutes, see infra note 63; see also Minute 283, supra 
note 44.  See generally Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico 
Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio 
Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 (pronouncing the intent of both countries 
to provide preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems that 
relate to beneficial uses); Minute 261 of the International Boundary and Water 
Commission: Recommendations for the Solution to the Border Sanitation Problems, 
Sept. 24, 1979, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5099 (addressing border sanitation problems 
related to cross-border waters); Minute 270 of the International Boundary and Water 
Commission: Recommendations for the First Stage Treatment and Disposal Facilities for 
the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja 
California, Apr. 30, 1985, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 11267 [hereinafter Minute 270] 
(providing for the construction of Mexican sewage treatment facilities); Minute 296 of 
the International Boundary and Water Commission: Distribution of Construction, 
Operation and Maintenance Costs for the International Wastewater Treatment Plant 
Constructed Under the Agreements in Commission Minute No. 283 for the Solution of 
the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California/Tijuana, Baja California, Apr. 
16, 1997, U.S.-Mex., available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min296.pdf 
[hereinafter Minute 296] (distributing the financial cost of the International Wastewater 
Treatment Plant). 
 58. Minute 283, supra note 44. 
 59. Id. at 5.  The commissioners of both the United States and Mexican sections of 
the International Boundary and Water Commission felt that this facility (and its 
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agreed to treat60 twenty-five mgd to “secondary”61 standards.62  The 
agreement further prescribed that the USIBWC63 would design, construct, 
and operate the treatment facility.64  In 1994 the USIBWC and the EPA 
 
accompanying pipeline system) “would permanently and definitively resolve the existing 
border sanitation problem.”  Id. at 4–5.  However, “[t]his new agreement clearly was not 
a comprehensive solution because it did not address wet-weather stormwater flows, the 
inadequacy of the San Antonio plant, or the need for more capacity beyond the agreed upon 
twenty-five mgd.”  Minan, supra note 6, at 62.  For a description of the International 
Boundary and Water Commission, see infra note 63.  For a brief description of the San 
Antonio de los Buenos treatment facility, see supra note 28.  Minute 283 was a long time 
coming, as Congress had already authorized the construction of an international 
wastewater treatment plant three years earlier.  Minan, supra note 6, at 62.  
Congressional authorization is found in the Water Quality Act of 1987.  33 U.S.C. § 1251. 
 60. Wastewater treatment methods involve either unit operations (the application 
of physical forces) or unit processes (the removal of contaminants via chemical or 
biological reactions).  METCALF & EDDY, INC. ET AL., WASTEWATER ENGINEERING: 
TREATMENT AND REUSE 11 (4th ed. 2003).  Current technology combines unit operations 
and unit processes to provide the following levels of treatment: preliminary, primary, 
advanced primary, secondary, and advanced (or tertiary).  Id.  Preliminary treatment 
involves the removal of large objects such as “rags, sticks, floatables, grit, and grease 
that may cause maintenance or operational problems.”  Id.  Primary treatment usually 
involves the use of sedimentation to remove “a portion of the suspended solids and 
organic matter from the wastewater.”  Id.  For a definition of advanced primary 
treatment, see infra note 67.  For a definition of secondary treatment, see infra note 61.  
For a definition of advanced or tertiary treatment, see infra note 173. 
 61. In secondary treatment, “[b]iological processes are added to break down 
organic matter in the primary effluent by oxidation and production of bacterial biomass.  
Biological waste treatment systems, based on bacterial decomposition of organic matter, 
can be classified as activated sludge, waste stabilization ponds . . . , and trickling filters.”  
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROGRESS IN WATER QUALITY: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT IN MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT 2-27 tbl.2-2 (2000).  
Secondary treatment standards, which involve effluent limitations for suspended solids, 
chemical and biological oxygen demand, and pH levels, are prescribed by the Clean 
Water Act.  40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (2001). 
 62. Minute 283, supra note 44, at 4. 
 63. The IBWC was established by an international convention between the United 
States and Mexico in 1889.  It consists of a U.S. section and a Mexican section.  Treaty 
provisions that call for joint action or agreements by the two governments are handled by 
or through the U.S. Department of State and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations of 
Mexico.  The IBWC applies the rights and obligations assumed by each government 
under broad treaties.  It does this through smaller more specific agreements (subject to 
approval by each government), which are recorded as minutes.  Once signed by both 
governments, the minutes are binding.  International Boundary and Water Commission, 
About the IBWC, http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/About_us.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 64. Mexico is required to contribute to the costs of construction as follows: Under 
Minute 270, the Mexican government committed to the construction of a number of 
sanitary wastewater treatment and disposal facilities.  Minute 270, supra note 57.  
However, Minute 283 established that a portion of those funds would be reallocated to 
construction of the IWTP: “The cost corresponding to Mexico [for construction of the 
IWTP] shall be in an amount . . . equal to that which would have been used in the 
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solidified plans to build the IWTP and accompanying outfall facilities.65 
These plans began to materialize when the USIBWC completed 
construction and began operation of the IWTP in 1997.66  However, because 
the plant only treats to “advanced primary”67 levels, the IWTP does not live 
up to the mandates of Minute 283.68  As will be shown below, the 
USIBWC’s inability to meet secondary treatment standards is at the core of 
the current legal and political impasse.  The crucial developments that led to 
the USIBWC’s violation of federal and state laws are discussed below.  
More importantly, however, these developments provide critical lessons as 
to how a comprehensive solution may be accomplished. 
A.  The South Bay Ocean Outfall 
The South Bay Ocean Outfall (SBOO) may pose the most serious 
obstacle to protecting San Diego beaches from the environmental and 
health risks of Tijuana’s sewage.  The SBOO discharges partially treated 
sewage into an ocean current that could bring the sewage to shore.  As 
such, a comprehensive solution must be prepared to address the SBOO in 
the future. 
As mentioned above, the IWTP treats twenty-five mgd of Tijuana’s 
sewage to advanced primary levels.  After receiving treatment at the 
IWTP, the effluent flows through the South Bay Land Outfall (SBLO)69 
 
construction, operation and maintenance of the treatment plant planned for the Rio El 
Alamar.”  Minute 283, supra note 44, at 6.  This amount was later fixed at $16.8 million, 
to be paid to the United States in ten annual payments.  Minute 296, supra note 57, at 4. 
 65. For the specific documents and evaluations that resulted in this decision, see 
infra Part II.B.  For a discussion of these outfall facilities, see infra Part II.A. 
 66. JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 160. 
 67. Advanced primary treatment generally involves a process whereby suspended 
solids and organic matter are removed from wastewater by the application of chemicals or 
filtration devices.  METCALF & EDDY, INC. ET AL., supra note 60, at 11.  Under optimal 
circumstances, the application of chemicals can result in the removal of 80% to 90% of the 
total suspended solids (TSS), 50% to 80% of the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), and 
80% to 90% of the bacteria.  Id. at 497.  However, conservative estimates suggest a BOD-
removal efficiency of 50%.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 61, at 2-26 n.1, 2-27.  BOD  
is a measurement that allows scientists to compare the relative polluting 
strength of different organic substances.  The widest application of the BOD 
test, however, is for measuring waste load concentrations to (influent load) and 
discharged from (effluent load) [treatment facilities] and evaluating the BOD-
removal efficiency of these treatment systems. 
Id. at 1-5.  For an in-depth discussion of BOD, see id. at 2-10. 
 68. Recall that Minute 283 calls for the construction of a secondary treatment 
facility.  See Minute 283, supra note 44, at 5. 
 69. The SBLO is an underground concrete pipe that is 12,300 feet long, 114 inches 
in diameter, and delivers effluent from the IWTP to the SBOO.  JAMIESON, supra note 1, 
at 144.  The SBLO was fully funded by the USIBWC and completed in March 1994.  Id. 
at 152.  The United States committed to building this pipeline, as well as the SBOO, in 
Minute 283.  Minute 283, supra note 44, at 6. 
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and the SBOO until it is finally discharged into the Pacific Ocean.  The 
SBOO is eleven-feet wide in diameter and runs westward underneath the 
ocean floor for about 3.5 miles until it discharges the effluent at a depth 
of ninety-three feet.70  The outfall was a necessary addition to the border 
treatment facilities because the United States has stringent requirements 
for discharging effluent into receiving waters.71  The purpose of 
discharging effluent at these depths is to help ensure that the effluent 
does not return to shore.72 
The city of San Diego (City) was responsible for the planning and 
construction of the SBOO and began the environmental review process 
pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).73  
However, construction of the SBOO was delayed in 1994 when the 
Surfrider Foundation (Surfrider)74 brought suit against the City for 
failing to comply with the environmental impact report (EIR)75 standards 
mandated by CEQA.76  Surfrider contended that the City was circumventing 
 
 70. JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 179–80. 
 71. Id. at 142. 
 72. DEV. & ENVTL. PLANNING DIV., CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SOUTH BAY TUNNEL AND 
OCEAN OUTFALL: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 3.0-1 (1995).   
 73. CEQA requires governmental agencies to conduct environmental impact 
reports (EIRs) for proposed projects in order to help ensure that the environment is not 
adversely impacted.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15003 (2003). 
The EIR is the primary means of achieving the Legislature’s considered 
declaration that it is the policy of this state to “take all action necessary to 
protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental quality of the state.”  The 
EIR is therefore “the heart of CEQA.”  [It] is an “environmental ‘alarm bell’ 
whose purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible officials to 
environmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no 
return.” . . . If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis 
on which its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally 
significant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond 
accordingly to action with which it disagrees. 
Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 282–
83 (Cal. 1989) (in banc) (citations omitted). 
 74. “The Surfrider Foundation is a non-profit environmental organization 
dedicated to the protection and enjoyment of the world’s oceans, waves and beaches for 
all people, through conservation, activism, research and education.”  Surfrider 
Foundation, Surfrider Mission & Principles, at http://www.surfrider.org/mission.htm 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 75. For a description of the function and importance of the EIR, see supra note 73. 
 76. Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego, No. D026312 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 
1997).  Surfrider contended that the City (1) failed to comply with CEQA’s procedural 
requirements for a focused EIR, (2) failed to comply with CEQA’s substantive 
requirements because the City’s focused EIR neither adequately described the project, its 
significant environmental effects, and its growth-inducing and cumulative impacts nor 
provided a basis for the finding that there would be no significant environmental effects 
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CEQA’s statutory protections by not disclosing potentially adverse 
effects to the city council and the public.77 
This litigation was considered necessary because the City planned to 
proceed with construction of the SBOO even though the full impact of 
the South Bay gyre remained uncertain.78  The South Bay gyre is a 
predominantly counterclockwise ocean current79 off the coast of San 
Diego and is present approximately eighty-seven percent of the time.80  
The complaint sought to enjoin construction of the SBOO until 
independent studies determined that the gyre would not transport sewage 
from the outfall into the San Diego region.81 
Surfrider’s concerns stemmed from the fact that the City’s own engineers 
and expert consultants recommended further analysis of the gyre before 
proceeding with construction.82  These expert consultants informed the City 
that the “potential for onshore transport of the effluent plume was not 
addressed [in the engineers’ study of the outfall].  The selected diffuser site 
is located on the inshore side of a current gyre that could bring effluent 
ashore in this area.”83  Experts from the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography, who have studied the gyre since the late 1960s, reached 
similar conclusions.  Doctors Douglas Irman, Pearn P. Niiler, and Scott 
Jenkins of Scripps found that sewage discharged from the outfall will rise to 
the surface in significant quantities, impact South Bay beaches in undiluted 
amounts, and pose threats of contamination and disease.84 
 
from the operation of the outfall, and (3) did not provide an adequate statement of 
overriding considerations.  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 49, 61, 78, 82, Surfrider Found. 
v. City of San Diego (No. D026312). 
 77. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego (No. D026312). 
 78. Interview with Marco Gonzalez, Chairman, San Diego Chapter of the Surfrider 
Foundation and Senior Attorney, San Diego BayKeeper, in San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 12, 2002). 
 79. I ENG’G-SCI., INC., TIJUANA OCEANOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING STUDY: OCEAN 
MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 2-7 (1988). 
 80. Id. at 1-1.  These currents flow onshore at Imperial Beach and then turn north 
and flow alongshore for 10.6 miles to Coronado.  At this point, they turn and flow 
offshore to the west for almost ten miles and then to the south to complete the circle.  
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 21, Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego (No. D026312).   
 81. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 89, Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego (No. D026312). 
 82. Engineers hired by the City concluded that “[t]he existing current meter data 
needs to be examined to determine the potential for plume impingement from the South 
Bay outfall on the Point Loma outfall and the near-shore areas, and whether plume 
impingement will affect the ability of the ocean outfalls to meet receiving water 
standards.”  ENG’G-SCI., INC., TIJUANA OCEANOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING STUDY: PHASE III 
MEASUREMENT PROGRAM 4-1 (1989). 
 83. KINNETIC LABS., INC., MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED 
SECONDARY TREATMENT SYSTEM 5-45 (1991) (citation omitted).  Other experts hired by the 
City—Kinnetic Laboratories in conjunction with CWP Geosciences—stated that the 
“South Bay alternative is not desirable because the gyre condition could periodically allow 
effluent to circulate back into the nearshore areas, thereby inhibiting dispersion of the 
effluent.”  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 22, Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego (No. D026312). 
 84. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 21–22, Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego 
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Despite these warnings, the trial court ruled that the City had complied 
with CEQA procedures and the appellate court affirmed.85  As such, the 
SBOO was constructed and began discharging effluent into the Pacific 
Ocean in 1999.86  However, in subsequent litigation with the USIBWC, 
Surfrider eventually achieved its goal of reviewing the gyre’s impact.87 
This litigation will be discussed in greater detail below.  At this point, it 
should be noted that Surfrider entered into a consent decree with the 
USIBWC.88  The consent decree calls for a thorough investigation89 as to 
 
(No. D026312).  Under normal circumstances, a process called “initial dilution” results in the 
rapid and irreversible turbulent mixing of wastewater with ocean water around 
the point of discharge. 
 For a submerged buoyant discharge, characteristic of most municipal and 
industrial wastes that are released from the submarine outfalls, the momentum 
of the discharge and its initial buoyancy act together to produce turbulent 
mixing.  Initial dilution in this case is completed when the diluting wastewater 
ceases to rise in the water column and first begins to spread horizontally. 
STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA OCEAN 
PLAN: WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLANT, OCEAN WATERS OF CALIFORNIA 25 (2001). 
 85. In March 1996, the trial court ruled: 
(1) “the City did not abuse its discretion in approving the Focused Environmental 
Impact Report”; (2) “there is substantial evidence to support the City’s finding 
that there will not be significant effects on the environment from the South Bay 
Ocean Outfall”; (3) “the City’s statement of overriding considerations [was] 
adequate”; and (4) “the City appropriately followed CEQA procedures.” 
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9–10, Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 21, 1997) (No. D026312)  (quoting Ruling Re: Petition for Writ of Mandate at 1–2, 
Surfrider Found. v. City of San Diego, No. 690027 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1996)) (alteration in 
original). 
 86. JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 179. 
 87. Consent Decree at 10–11, Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 
16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441) (current Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Under phase one of the investigation, the parties will designate an expert to 
evaluate whether current monitoring programs provide enough data to determine whether 
the SBOO is the cause of the bacterial exceedances.  Id. at 11.  If current monitoring is 
insufficient in this regard, the USIBWC, in conjunction with a private contractor and 
physical oceanographer, will submit recommendations for phase two, which includes the 
design of a monitoring program that can identify the cause of the bacterial exceedances.  
Id. at 14.  The deadline for submission of a draft report of phase one is April 15, 2004, 
and the deadline for submission of the final draft is June 15, 2004.  Notification of 
Deadline Extension Pursuant to Section XIV.B of the Surfrider-IBWC Consent Decree at 
2, Ramirez (No. 99-CV-2441).  The development of a new ocean monitoring technology 
known as CODAR, which was developed by joint efforts of the Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography and the city of Imperial Beach, will most likely be used in phase two.  
CODAR is a radar system that transmits radio waves across the ocean’s surface and then 
processes the return signal.  In doing so, scientists can map both surface and underwater 
currents.  Furthermore, scientists can see how these currents move in real time.  Leslie 
Wolf Branscomb, Imperial Beach, Scripps Team in Bid to Solve Beach Pollution, SAN 
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whether effluent discharged from the SBOO is the source of bacterial 
exceedances90 recorded at various monitoring stations91 off the coast of 
southern San Diego and northern Baja.  The impact of the gyre will be 
evaluated in these studies as well.92  These studies are currently 
underway. 
The results of these studies may have a profound impact on the future 
of current treatment facilities.  If it is found that the SBOO has caused 
environmental impacts along San Diego’s beaches, the release point of 
the outfall may have to be moved out of the gyre’s reach at astronomical 
cost.  These developments must be taken into account in order to provide 
a comprehensive solution to the Tijuana sewage dilemma.  As will be 
noted below, the Bajagua project, which includes water reclamation 
capabilities, is the only alternative that accounts for this problem.  
Reclaiming the water is an extremely efficient solution because it will 
reduce the amount of effluent discharged from the SBOO and provide a 
much-needed resource. 
 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 30, 2002, at B1. 
 90. The consent decree defines bacterial exceedances as collected samples that 
contain bacteria which exceed any of the fecal or total coliform density limitations 
established by the Water Quality Control Plan for Ocean Waters of California (also 
known as the California Ocean Plan).  Consent Decree at 5, Ramirez  (No. 99-CV-2441) 
(current Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree).  The specific limitations are as follows: 
(1)  Samples of water from each sampling station shall have a density of total 
  coliform organisms less than 1,000 per 100 ml (10 per ml); provided that 
not more than 20 percent of the samples at any sampling station, in any 
30-day period, may exceed 1,000 per 100 ml (10 per ml), and provided 
further that no single sample when verified by a repeat sample taken 
within 48 hours shall exceed 10,000 per 100 ml (100 per ml). 
(2) The fecal coliform density based on a minimum of not less than five 
samples for any 30-day period, shall not exceed a geometric mean of 200 
per 100 ml nor shall more than 10 percent of the total samples during any 
60-day period exceed 400 per 100 ml. 
STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note 84, at 4.  These limitations apply to a zone  
extending from the coastline out one thousand feet into the ocean or to a depth of thirty 
feet, whichever is further from the coastline.  It also includes kelp beds and areas 
designated by the Regional Board for water contact sports that are outside the zone.  Id.  
For more information on the California Ocean Plan, see infra note 133. 
 91. These monitoring stations were set up under the Receiving Water Monitoring 
Program instituted pursuant to the September 15, 1999 Memorandum of Understanding 
No. IBM 99-34 between the city of San Diego and the USIBWC.  The City takes water 
samples at the stations, analyzes them, and then sends monthly and annual reports to the 
USIBWC.  Consent Decree at 6–7, Ramirez (No. 99-CV-2441) (current Surfrider-
USIBWC consent decree). 
 92. Id. at 12.  Other possible causes of the bacteria exceedances that will be 
considered include the following: (1) partially treated and raw sewage discharged from 
Punta Banderas, Mexico, (2) sanitary system overflows at Playas, Mexico, (3) raw 
sewage discharged into the Tijuana River, and (4) sanitary sewer overflows and nonpoint 
source pollution in southern San Diego.  Id. at 11–12. 
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B.  The National Environmental Policy Act Litigation 
The National Environmental Policy Act litigation discussed below is 
useful in understanding Tijuana’s present sewage circumstances because 
it illustrates significant historical developments.  More importantly, 
however, it provides a key lesson concerning the various alternatives and 
technologies available in attempting to adequately treat sewage. 
As mentioned earlier, Minute 283 provided the basis for the 
construction of the IWTP.93  Under the agreement, the USIBWC is 
required to treat twenty-five mgd of sewage to secondary levels.94  
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)95 mandates 
that federal agencies, such as the USIBWC, “identify and develop 
methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate 
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical 
considerations.”96  In other words, federal agencies must evaluate all 
feasible alternative courses of action when making decisions that 
significantly impact the environment.97  To comply with NEPA, 
 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 57–68; see also Minute 283, supra note 44, 
at 5.  The IWTP began operating in 1997.  It initially discharged its effluent through sewage 
facilities at Point Loma because the SBOO had not yet been completed.  The 
infrastructure that conveyed the effluent to Point Loma facilities was designed only for 
emergency purposes.  As such, the IWTP could only discharge thirteen mgd.  Once the 
SBOO was completed, the IWTP began treating its intended twenty-five mgd to 
advanced primary levels.  JAMIESON, supra note 1, at 160, 162. 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 58–68; see also Minute 283, supra note 44, at 5. 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).  The purposes of NEPA include the following: 
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable 
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate 
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a 
Council on Environmental Quality. 
Id. 
 96. Id. § 4332.  “[NEPA] requires federal agencies to integrate environmental 
values into their decision making processes by considering the environmental impacts of 
their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions.”  U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), at http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/nepa/index.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2003). 
 97. When the agency makes recommendations about actions that significantly 
impact the environment, the proposal must include the following: 
the environmental impact of the proposed action, . . . any adverse environmental 
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, . . . 
alternatives to the proposed action, . . . the relationship between local short-term 
uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
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federal agencies prepare statements known as environmental impact 
statements (EISs).98 
In 1994, the USIBWC issued a final environmental impact statement 
(FEIS).99  Pursuant to NEPA, the FEIS evaluated various plans to deal 
with the escalating cross-border sewage problem and ultimately 
identified the IWTP and ocean outfall facilities as the preferred 
alternative.100  More importantly however, the FEIS proposed using an 
activated sludge technology to attain secondary treatment levels.101 
After large solids are removed from the wastewater during primary 
treatment, an activated sludge technology is one method that can be used 
to remove remaining pollutants and achieve secondary treatment 
standards.102  This generally involves “a biological process that uses 
microorganisms to remove dissolved organic matter from the 
wastewater.  At the end of this process, the microorganisms fall to the 
bottom of the secondary sedimentation tanks and are collected.”103  This 
by-product, which accumulates at the bottom of the tank, forms a sludge 
that must be removed on a regular basis.  The treated effluent will then 
“be chlorinated, if necessary, to kill disease-causing organisms and 
 
productivity, and . . . any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
 98. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note  96. 
 99. FINAL EIS, supra note 38. 
 100. Id. at S-13.  Three other main options were considered.  Under the no action 
alternative, the United States would have built no new treatment facilities.  Id. at S-5.  
The standby interceptor project (also known as the return to sender alternative) would 
have intercepted Tijuana’s wastewater as it crossed the border and pumped it back into 
Tijuana’s limited sewage system.  Id. at S-10 to S-11.  Neither of these options was 
viable for two reasons.  First, significant health and environmental concerns would 
continue unabated.  Id. at S-11, S-12.  Second, the EPA and the USIBWC are required to 
“work within the framework of international treaties and agreements with Mexico.”  U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & INT’L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N, PUBLIC RECORD OF 
DECISION FOR THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL 
BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION: INTERNATIONAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 
AND OUTFALL FACILITIES, SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL. 5 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 RECORD 
OF DECISION].  In other words, because the United States committed to a twenty-five mgd 
treatment facility in Minute 283, the no action and return to sender alternatives would 
violate a binational agreement.  The third alternative considered in the FEIS—IWTP on 
the Tia Juana street site—was similar to the alternative actually chosen except that it 
called for a different site location.  FINAL EIS, supra note 38, at S-10.  This alternative 
was not recommended, however, because it would have resulted in “greater adverse 
environmental impacts.”  Id. at S-12. 
 101. FINAL EIS, supra note 38, at S-6 to S-7. 
 102. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, International Wastewater Treatment 
Plant, Long Term Treatment Options Supplemental EIS Fact Sheet, at http://www.epa.gov/ 
region09/water/iwtp/eltseisfact.html (last updated Jan. 27, 1998). 
 103. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, International Wastewater Treatment 
Plant Project Update, at http://www.epa.gov/region09/water/iwtp/iwtp396.html (last 
updated Oct. 17, 1996). 
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dechlorinated to remove potentially toxic chlorine prior to disposal to the 
Pacific Ocean.”104   
The USIBWC issued a record of decision that solidified its plan to 
proceed with the IWTP and the activated sludge proposals set out in the 
FEIS,105 and the EPA certified that the USIBWC met NEPA requirements.106  
However, the San Diego chapter of the Sierra Club107 sued, claiming that 
NEPA procedures had not been followed.108  Surfrider then intervened in 
the lawsuit.  Specifically, these organizations claimed that the USIBWC 
violated NEPA procedures by failing to adequately evaluate biological 
ponding technologies for secondary treatment.109  These technologies 
work by allowing “sedimentation and decomposition of wastewater 
pollutants by natural processes.  Algae or mechanical aeration devices 
can accelerate treatment by the ponds.”110  Completely mixed-aerated 
(CMA) ponds and advanced integrated pond systems are two types of 
ponding technologies.111 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. 1994 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 100, at 1, 19. 
 106. Id. at 11. 
 107. The Sierra Club is a grassroots environmental organization with chapters 
throughout the United States and Canada.  It was founded in 1892 and currently has 
approximately 700,000 members.  Sierra Club, Sierra Club History, at http://www.sierraclub.org/ 
inside (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 108. Notice of Filing of Public Comments Regarding Proposed Consent Decree and 
Notice of the United States’ Withholding of Its Consent to Proposed Consent Decree at 
8, Surfrider Found. v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 109. Id.  The State Water Resources Control Board provided funding for an 
evaluation of the merits and feasibility of an advanced integrated pond system.  1994 
RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 100, at 14.  However, the evaluation found that this 
alternative technology was “too speculative” and that the urgency of chronic border 
pollution did not allow for the time that would be necessary to implement such 
technology.  Id. 
 110. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 102. 
 111. CMA ponds are more efficient than advanced integrated pond systems (AIPS).  
The AIPS planned for the South Bay would have required a total area of approximately 
102 acres, while the CMA technology would only require a total area of approximately 
thirty-six acres.  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & INT’L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N, FINAL 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: LONG TERM TREATMENT OPTIONS 
FOR THE SOUTH BAY INTERNATIONAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 1-4 to 1-5 (1999) 
[hereinafter FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS].  Furthermore, the AIPS alternative would have 
conflicted with San Diego County’s land use designations.  Id. at 1-6.  CMA ponds 
treatment works as follows: Influent from the primary treatment facility enters the 
system at the bottom of the first pond through an oxygenated digester pit.  This influent 
slowly rises and passes through a sludge blanket, where beneficial bacteria start to break 
down the pollutants in the wastewater.  Larger particles are trapped and settle to the 
bottom, where they are further digested by bacteria.  After the wastewater flows through 
the blanket, it circulates through the pond’s other digester pits, where bacteria continue 
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The USIBWC eventually agreed to evaluate this type of technology, 
resulting in a 1995 settlement of the NEPA lawsuit.112  The USIBWC 
later issued its findings in its final supplemental environmental impact 
statement, identifying the CMA ponds as the preferred alternative for 
secondary treatment at the IWTP.113  The CMA ponds technology is 
superior to activated sludge systems because it is more reliable; produces 
less sludge; has the lowest capital, maintenance, and operation costs; can 
be implemented in a more expeditious manner; and has had stronger 
public support.114 
A critical lesson must be learned from the NEPA litigation: A 
comprehensive solution to the cross-border sewage crisis must adopt 
CMA ponding technology, as it is the most economically efficient and 
environmentally sound technology to date.  This point will be further 
elaborated in Part III, which provides an in-depth explanation as to why 
the Bajagua project surpasses other alternatives.  However, the crux of 
the current impasse must first be discussed. 
C.  USIBWC Violation of Federal and State Laws 
As discussed above, the USIBWC finished construction of the IWTP 
in 1997.115  However, recall that the USIBWC failed to meet its 
obligations under Minute 283 because the plant did not treat the twenty-
five mgd to secondary levels.116  In 1997, the USIBWC and the EPA 
agreed to begin operating the IWTP despite the plant’s deficiencies.117  
Thus, a two-stage plan was developed, whereby primary treatment 
would begin immediately and secondary treatment technology would be 
implemented at a later date.118  This decision was made in part because it 
 
to break down pollutants.  Sludge accumulates at the bottom of these pits.  The 
wastewater then flows to a second pond.  The upper portion of this pond is mixed with 
mechanical aeration.  Additional wastes settle in the unaerated bottom portion of the 
pond.  The effluent then flows out of the upper portion of the pond and can be discharged 
through an ocean outfall.  Notice of Filing of Public Comments Regarding Proposed 
Consent Decree and Notice of the United States’ Withholding of Its Consent to Proposed 
Consent Decree at 14–15, Bernal (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 112. Notice of Filing of Public Comments Regarding Proposed Consent Decree and 
Notice of the United States’ Withholding of Its Consent to Proposed Consent Decree at 
8, Bernal (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 113. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, supra note 111, at 1-6. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.  
 117. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & INT’L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N, PUBLIC 
RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION: SOUTH BAY INTERNATIONAL 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT INTERIM OPERATION 1 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 
RECORD OF DECISION]. 
 118. BILL SHUSTER, TIJUANA RIVER VALLEY ESTUARY AND BEACH SEWAGE 
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was clear that the massive debate over secondary treatment 
technology119 would continue to delay progress.120  Another factor in this 
decision was the need to help alleviate the sewage crisis as quickly as 
possible and provide some treatment of Mexican wastewater.121  In other 
words, treatment of twenty-five mgd to advanced primary levels was 
better than no treatment at all. 
In November 1996, the California Regional Water Quality Control 
Board (Regional Board) issued a national pollution discharge elimination 
system (NPDES) permit, which provided waste discharge requirements 
for the IWTP.122  NPDES permits serve as a means of ensuring that 
individual dischargers, such as the USIBWC, comply with the general 
effluent limitations123 promulgated under the Clean Water Act.124  In 
 
CLEANUP ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-842, pt. 1, at 4 (2000). 
 119. See supra Part II.B. 
 120. Minan, supra note 6, at 65. 
 121. 1997 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 117, at 1. 
 122. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., San Diego Region, Order No. 96-50: 
Waste Discharge Requirements for the International Boundary and Water Commission, 
U.S. Section 9 (1996). 
 123. In 1972, Congress amended the Clean Water Act (formally known as the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act) because it had been “inadequate in every vital 
aspect.”  Envtl. Prot. Agency v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976).  Two primary 
changes were made to remedy these inadequacies.  Id. at 204.  The first focused on 
establishing stringent point source effluent limitations.  Id.  Effluent limitation is defined 
in the Clean Water Act as “any restriction established by a State or the Administrator [of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency] on quantities, rates, and concentrations of 
chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point 
sources into [the nation’s waters].”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2002).  Point sources are “any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, . . . or vessel or other 
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”  Id. § 1362(14).  Thus, 
one goal was and continues to be the creation of federal and state standards for specific 
dischargers and polluters based on current science and technology.  The second focuses 
on enforcing those limitations against dischargers and polluters.  Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
426 U.S. at 205.  This is accomplished through NPDES permits.  See infra note 124. 
 124. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 426 U.S. at 205.  The NPDES permitting process is 
specifically provided for in section 402 of the Clean Water Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1342.  The 
Act authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to issue NPDES permits.  Id.  However, 
state governments may also administer NPDES permits “upon EPA approval of the 
State’s proposal to administer its own program.”  Envtl. Prot. Agency, 426 U.S. at 208.  
This authority is set out in section 402(b) of the Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)–(9).  Once 
the EPA delegates that authority to the state, that state is responsible for issuing permits 
and enforcing any violations.  Id.  “On May 14, 1973, the Acting EPA Administrator 
approved the State of California’s request to administer its own NPDES permit program 
. . . .”  Envtl. Prot. Agency, 426 U.S. at 209.  The California State Water Quality Control 
Board and affiliated regional boards administer the state’s NPDES program under the 
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.  See CAL. WATER CODE § 13160 (1992) 
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addition, Congress had authorized $239.4 million in order to fund the 
construction of both primary and secondary treatment facilities.125  
However, because the USIBWC and the EPA opted for the two-stage 
implementation plan, the USIBWC could not meet its waste discharge 
requirement of treating the twenty-five mgd to secondary levels.  
Accordingly, the Regional Board issued a cease and desist order that 
temporarily delayed meeting those requirements.126  
However, problems began to arise when the USIBWC spent the vast 
majority of its funding on the IWTP and failed to build a secondary 
treatment plant.127  These problems were compounded by the fact that 
Congress capped funding for both the primary and secondary treatment 
facilities at the IWTP site at $239.4 million.128  As a result, the EPA and 
the USIBWC requested additional funding to construct a CMA ponds 
secondary treatment facility at the IWTP site.129  However, Congress 
rejected this request, citing as its justification the USIBWC’s failure to 
implement secondary treatment facilities with the original $239.4 million 
appropriation.130  With no money left to construct a secondary facility, 
the USIBWC was soon operating its treatment facilities in violation of 
the Clean Water Act131 and its NPDES permit.132  The USIBWC has also 
been operating in violation of both the California Ocean Plan133 and the 
 
(providing that the state board is authorized to exercise any powers delegated by the 
Clean Water Act). 
 125. Notice of Filing of Public Comments Regarding Proposed Consent Decree and 
Notice of the United States’ Withholding of Its Consent to Proposed Consent Decree at 
7, Surfrider Found. v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 126. See Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., San Diego Region, Cease and 
Desist Order No. 96-52 (1996).  The cease and desist order amended the USIBWC’s 
compliance schedule by requiring a record of decision for secondary treatment 
technology by May 1, 1999 and complete construction of secondary treatment facilities 
by December 31, 2000.  Id. at 1. 
 127. The bulk of these funds, approximately $230 million, was spent on 
construction of the IWTP and its outfall facilities.  Letter from J. Charles Fox, Assistant 
Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to James T. Walsh, Chairman, 
Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies (Apr. 14, 2000) 
(on file with author).  A secondary treatment facility could not be built with the limited 
remaining funds.  The proposed CMA ponds treatment facility would cost an estimated 
$44 million.  Minan, supra note 6, at 65–66. 
 128. BILL SHUSTER, TIJUANA RIVER VALLEY ESTUARY AND BEACH SEWAGE 
CLEANUP ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-842, pt. 1, at 4 (2000) 
 129. FINAL EIS, supra note 38, at 3-9. 
 130. H.R. REP. NO. 106-842, pt. 1, at 4. 
 131. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (2000) (requiring that publicly owned treatment 
facilities comply with secondary treatment effluent limitations). 
 132. The USIBWC could not meet the compliance schedule set out by the cease and 
desist order issued by the Regional Board.  After two time extensions, the USIBWC still 
could not come into compliance and was directed to complete secondary treatment 
facilities.  At that point the USIBWC was in violation of its NPDES permit.  Minan, 
supra note 6, at 76. 
 133. The California Ocean Plan was adopted by the State Water Resources Control 
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San Diego Basin Plan.134 
Accordingly, in November 1999, Surfrider sued the USIBWC for its 
continuing failure to come into compliance with state and federal law.135  
After approximately one year of negotiations,136 the parties formulated a 
schedule for compliance in a formal consent decree.137  The parties 
signed and lodged the proposed consent decree with the court.  Under 
this consent decree, the USIBWC would have been required to complete 
a secondary treatment project that ensured compliance with all 
applicable effluent limitations by January 22, 2003.138  The USIBWC 
committed to the mandates of the consent decree with the condition that 
final approval and entry would “be subject to public comment and 
consideration of any comments following notice of the lodging of this 
Consent Decree in the Federal Register.”139  
During this comment period, the Regional Board and the city of 
Imperial Beach140 vehemently objected to the consent decree.  The 
 
Board in 1972 and was amended in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1990, and 1997.  STATE WATER 
RES. CONTROL BD., RESOLUTION NO. 2000-108: ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA OCEAN PLAN 1 (2000), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/ 
resdec/resltn/2000/rs2000-108.doc. The state board reviews the plan at least every three 
years to ensure that water quality standards are adequate and are not allowing 
degradation of marine life or risk to human health.  Id.  
 134. The purpose of the San Diego Basin Plan (also known as the Water Quality 
Control Plan for the San Diego Basin) is to “(1) designate beneficial uses of the Region’s 
surface and ground waters; (2) designate water quality objectives for the reasonable 
protection of those uses; and (3) establish an implementation plan to achieve the 
objectives.”  CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., SAN DIEGO REGION, WATER 
QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR THE SAN DIEGO BASIN PLAN (9) (1994).  It was adopted by 
the Regional Board in 1975 as mandated by the Clean Water Act and the Porter-Cologne 
Water Quality Control Act.  Id.  
 135. The Surfrider Foundation sought injunctive relief pursuant to sections 301 and 
402 of the Clean Water Act.  See 33 U.S.C §§ 1311, 1342.  Surfrider sued because the 
USIBWC discharges effluent through the SBOO that has not been treated to secondary 
treatment standards and does not meet toxicity standards.  Consent Decree at 2, Surfrider 
Found. v. Ramirez, (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441) (current Surfrider-
USIBWC consent decree). 
 136. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 56 (statement of Marco A. Gonzalez, Chairman, 
San Diego Surfrider Foundation). 
 137. Consent Decree, Surfrider Found. v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) 
(No. 99-CV-2441) (rescinded Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree). 
 138. Id. at 5.  The consent decree did not mandate the use of any particular 
secondary treatment technology. 
 139. Id. at 17. 
 140. Letter from Diane Rose, Mayor, Imperial Beach, to Chairman and Board Members, 
California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region (Dec. 13, 2000) (on file 
with author).  Imperial Beach is the city just north of the U.S.-Mexico  border.   
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Regional Board found that the consent decree was not in the best interest 
of the State of California141 because it inappropriately extended the time 
for compliance beyond the extension provided in the cease and desist 
order.142  The Regional Board also protested that the consent decree lacked 
coercive penalties in the event of the USIBWC’s continued 
noncompliance.143  Lastly, the Regional Board objected to the force 
majeure clause144 contained in the consent decree.  The Regional Board 
stated that the consent decree included “inappropriately vague provisions 
excusing IBWC from non-performance under a variety of conditions that 
are unacceptable to the [Regional Board], including IBWC’s inability to 
obtain funding for secondary treatment facilities.”145  The city of 
Imperial Beach made similar protests.146  The USIBWC relied heavily 
on this negative reaction as leverage to withdraw from the Surfrider 
consent decree.147 
Another development used by the USIBWC to withdraw from the 
consent decree occurred when Congress rejected the EPA’s request for 
 
 141. Letter from John H. Robertus, Executive Officer, California Regional Water 
Quality Control Board, San Diego Region, to S. Randall Humm, Trial Attorney, United States 
Department of Justice, Environmental Defense Section (Dec. 15, 2000) (on file with author). 
 142. Id.  The cease and desist order called for complete construction of secondary 
facilities by December 31, 2000.  See supra note 126. 
 143. See Letter from John H. Robertus to S. Randall Humm, supra note 141. 
 144. The original Surfrider consent decree defined a force majeure as 
an event arising from causes beyond the control of the IBWC . . . which delays 
or prevents the performance of the IBWC’s obligations . . . despite the IBWC’s 
best efforts to fulfill its obligations.  The requirement that the IBWC exercise 
“best efforts to fulfill its obligations” include [sic] using best efforts to 
anticipate any potential Force Majeure event (1) as it is occurring and (2) 
following the potential Force Majeure event, such that delay is minimized to 
the greatest extent possible. 
Consent Decree at 8, Surfrider Found. v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-
CV-2441) (rescinded Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree).  The parties could not agree 
on what events constituted a force majeure event.  However, a compromise was reached 
whereby the USIBWC was permitted to include its contention that a lack of funding and 
financial ability to comply with the January 2003 deadline constituted a force majeure 
event.  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter 
Consent Decree at 5, Bernal (No. 99-CV-2441).  Surfrider felt confident that if the 
USIBWC invoked the clause, Surfrider could prove to the court that the lack of funding 
was not a circumstance beyond the control of the USIBWC because the San Diego 
congressional delegation and members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee made clear that if the USIBWC moved forward with Bajagua, the funding 
cap would be lifted.  Letter from Marco A. Gonzalez, Chairman, San Diego Chapter of 
the Surfrider Foundation, to John H. Robertus, Executive Officer, San Diego Regional 
Water Quality Control Board, and S. Randall Humm, Trial Attorney, United States 
Department of Justice, Environmental Defense Section (Sept. 4, 2002) (on file with author). 
 145. See Letter from John H. Robertus to S. Randall Humm, supra note 141. 
 146. See Letter from Diane Rose to Chairman and Board Members, supra note 140. 
 147. Notice of Filing of Public Comments Regarding Proposed Consent Decree and 
Notice of the United States’ Withholding of Its Consent to Proposed Consent Decree at 
3, Bernal (No. 99-CV-2441). 
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funds to construct the CMA ponds technology selected in the 1999 record 
of decision.148  The USIBWC claimed that compliance under the consent 
decree was based on using this technology for secondary treatment.149  
The court permitted the USIBWC’s withdrawal, though there may not 
have been proper grounds to do so,150 and the parties reentered 
negotiations. 
In February 2001, the State of California, on behalf of the Regional 
Board, brought suit against the USIBWC.  The State based its claim on 
the same violations of federal and state law and the same environmental 
and health concerns as Surfrider.151 In reliance on the Regional Board’s 
vehement opposition to Surfrider’s consent decree, Surfrider changed 
course and instead focused on the ocean monitoring studies discussed 
above.  To Surfrider, it seemed appropriate to leave it to the state to 
produce more stringent compliance timelines, coercive penalties, and 
exclusion of the force majeure clause.152  As before, Surfrider focused on 
establishing studies that would evaluate the South Bay gyre and the 
potential for on-shore transport of effluent after discharge from the 
SBOO.153  Surfrider and the USIBWC eventually entered into a consent 
decree which mandated that the USIBWC conduct proper studies 
concerning this threat.154 
Ultimately, the State concluded negotiations and also entered into a 
 
 148. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & INT’L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N, RECORD 
OF DECISION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION SOUTH BAY 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT: LONG TERM TREATMENT OPTIONS SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (1999).  
 149. The USIBWC claimed that in denying funding for secondary treatment, 
Congress had in effect “suspended implementation of the agencies’ ROD and made it 
impossible for [the USIBWC] ‘to complete’ by January 22, 2003 a secondary treatment 
‘project’ for the Treatment Plant.”  See Notice of Filing of Public Comments Regarding 
Proposed Consent Decree and Notice of the United States’ Withholding of Its Consent to 
Proposed Consent Decree at 23, Bernal (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 150. A federal agency can withdraw its consent to a consent decree if “the 
comments, views and allegations concerning the judgment disclose facts or 
considerations which indicate that the proposed judgment is inappropriate, improper or 
inadequate.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.7(b) (2002). 
 151. First Amended Complaint for Violations of the Clean Water Act and Related 
State Law Claims at 7, 9, Surfrider Found. v. Ortega (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 
99-CV-2441) (claiming violations of the Clean Water Act and the California Porter-
Cologne Water Quality Control Act). 
 152. Hearing, supra note 7, at 56 (statement of Marco A. Gonzalez, Chairman, San 
Diego Surfrider Foundation). 
 153. See supra Part II.A. 
 154. Id. 
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consent decree with the USIBWC. The parties then jointly lodged the 
decree with the court in July 2002.155  However, the consent decree did 
not appear as though it would bring about a timely resolution to the 
same issues faced by Surfrider.  One of the Regional Board’s main 
criticisms was that the Surfrider consent decree’s compliance date of 
January 22, 2003 inappropriately extended the USIBWC’s time for 
compliance.156  Rather than providing a more restrictive compliance 
schedule, the State’s consent decree allowed the USIBWC to continue 
operating the IWTP in violation of state and federal law until 
December 31, 2007.157  Furthermore, the State did not incorporate 
coercive penalties against the USIBWC.  The entire “Remedy for 
Noncompliance” section read as follows: “If USIBWC fails to take an 
action required by this Decree, the Regional Board may seek 
appropriate relief from the Court.  USIBWC reserves any and all 
defenses.”158  In addition, the consent decree contained a force majeure 
clause that excused the USIBWC from liability if noncompliance arose 
from circumstances beyond its control.159  Thus, the State facilitated the 
USIBWC’s avoidance of the January 22, 2003 compliance deadline by 
berating the initial Surfrider consent decree.  The State was then willing to 
enter into an agreement that would permit the USIBWC’s noncompliance 
for an additional five years. 
The Regional Board unanimously adopted the State-USIBWC consent 
decree, finding it to be in the public’s best interest.160  However, 
Surfrider actively protested adoption of the State’s consent decree 
during the public commenting period.161  Surfrider had a vested interest 
in ensuring that the State’s consent decree was as stringent as possible 
due to the inclusion of a specific clause in the Surfrider-USIBWC 
consent decree.  This clause stated that if the State and the USIBWC 
were to enter into a consent decree, both parties would be required to 
file a stipulation permitting Surfrider to enforce the agreed upon 
terms.162  The stipulations would have incorporated the compliance 
 
 155. Consent Decree at 18, Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 
1999) (No. 99-CV-2441) (State-USIBWC consent decree). 
 156. See Letter from John H. Robertus to S. Randall Humm, supra note 141. 
 157. Consent Decree at 7, Ramirez (No. 99-CV-2441) (State-USIBWC consent decree). 
 158. Id. at 9. 
 159. Id. at 12. 
 160. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of the People of 
the State of California for Entry of Proposed Consent Decree at 14, Ramirez (No. 99-
CV-2441). 
 161. Letter from Marco A. Gonzalez to John H. Robertus and S. Randall Humm, 
supra note 144 (urging the Regional Board not to approve the proposed State-USIBWC 
consent decree). 
 162. Consent Decree at 9–10, Ramirez (No. 99-CV-2441) (current Surfrider-
USIBWC consent decree). 
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schedule, including exceptions and limitations, into the original 
Surfrider-IBWC consent decree.163 
In January 2003, both the State and the USIBWC moved to enter the 
consent decree with the court.164  However, rather than accepting the 
consent decree, the court directed the parties to include “a mutually-
acceptable provision on what constitutes a force majeure event.”165  After 
the parties failed to reach an agreement, the court had no choice but to 
deny the parties’ motions.166  As a result, the case will be going to trial.167 
At this point, it is necessary to explain exactly how and why the 
Bajagua project is the superior alternative.  However, it is important to 
note that the Surfrider and State lawsuits do not call for the 
implementation of the Bajagua project per se.  Rather, they are critical in 
establishing the circumstances and timeline under which the USIBWC 
must commit to a solution and comply with federal and state law.  
III.  A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION 
The Bajagua project takes a radically different approach to solving 
cross-border sewage problems by providing for the construction of a 
fifty mgd secondary treatment facility in Mexico.168  This facility would 
serve as an alternative to the IWTP for long-term secondary wastewater 
treatment.   
The project, proposed by Agua Clara LLC,169 would require the IWTP 
to treat twenty-five mgd to primary levels and then pump the effluent via 
pipelines to the Mexican facility for secondary treatment.170  The 
 
 163. Letter from Marco A. Gonzalez to John H. Robertus and S. Randall Humm, 
supra note 144. 
 164. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of the People of the 
State of California for Entry of Proposed Consent Decree at 5, Ramirez (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 165. E-mail from Sally Spener, Public Affairs Officer, USIBWC, to Author (June 5, 
2003) (on file with author). 
 166. Order Denying Motions For Entry of Consent Decree at 2, Ramirez (No. 99-
CV-2441). 
 167. A status conference was held on July 14, 2003.  Id.  The trial date is scheduled 
for May 3, 2004.  Order Setting Pretrial Conference and Trial Date at 1, Ramirez (No. 
99-CV-2441).   
 168. AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-1, 1-17. 
 169. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Allow Agua 
Clara LLC to Participate as Amicus Curiae at 1, Surfrider Found. v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. 
filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441).  For further information about the Bajagua 
project, see Bajagua Project, LLC, Wastewater Treatment and Reclamation Project, at 
http://www.bajagua.com (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 170. AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-17 to 1-18. 
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Mexico-based plant would also have the capacity to treat an additional 
twenty-five mgd of completely untreated sewage to secondary 
standards.171  That fifty mgd would then be pumped back to the SBOO 
for final discharge172 or, as an alternative, could be treated further to 
tertiary levels.173 
The ability to reclaim water174 is one of the most appealing features of 
the Bajagua project and is a key reason why it is superior to other 
alternatives.  Water reclamation confers two enormous benefits.  First, 
reports indicate that water resources are extremely scarce along the 
international border.175  By treating sewage to advanced levels, Agua 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1-4. 
 173. Tertiary treatment involves the “[r]emoval of residual suspended solids (after 
secondary treatment), usually by granular medium filtration or microscreens.  
Disinfection [and nutrient removal are] also typically a part of tertiary treatment.” 
METCALF & EDDY, INC. ET AL., supra note 60, at 11.  Tertiary treatment systems 
generally have a BOD removal efficiency of ninety-five percent.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 61, at 2-27 tbl.2-2.  For a discussion of BOD as a measurement for 
waste load concentrations, see id. at 1-5.  The Bajagua project treatment facilities would 
attain tertiary treatment levels either through (1) disinfection with gaseous chlorine (if 
the water were to be used for landscape irrigation or application on agricultural crops not 
intended for human consumption) or (2) multimedia filtration and chlorination (if the water 
were to be used for cooling or industrial use).  AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-28. 
 174. See AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-27 (noting that reclaimed water has 
a number of potential uses, including greenbelt irrigation, agriculture, and various 
industrial uses).  The Bajagua project does not anticipate treating the effluent for human 
consumption.  Id. at 1-28.  Some municipalities in the United States have implemented 
“potable reuse” projects that “can turn municipal wastewater into reclaimed water that 
meets standards established by the Safe Water Drinking Act.”  COMM. TO EVALUATE THE 
VIABILITY OF AUGMENTING POTABLE WATER SUPPLIES WITH RECLAIMED WATER, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ISSUES IN POTABLE REUSE: THE VIABILITY OF AUGMENTING 
DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES WITH RECLAIMED WATER 14 (David A. Dobbs ed., 1998).  
For a discussion of health studies and controversies regarding potable reuse projects, see 
generally id. 
 175. This lack of water is an overriding concern in the border region: 
Conflicts over access to a clean, cheap and sufficient supply of water are 
becoming a defining feature of life along the 2,100-mile U.S.-Mexico border and 
of relations across it.  While for many outsiders the border is synonymous with 
drug trafficking and illegal immigration, when people who live here talk about 
confrontation between Mexicans and Americans or tension between urban areas 
and farmers or cooperation to solve problems, the dominant subject is water. 
Water Drives the U.S., Mexican Border Economy, U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE (Jan.  
2001), at http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcsupply/1watdri1.html.  The two main 
sources of Tijuana’s water supply are the Rodriguez Reservoir and an aqueduct 
connected to the Colorado River.  The water is distributed via two main systems: (1) the 
Mesa de Otay tank and (2) the Aguaje de la Tuna tank and the Colonia Oberera pump 
station.  Approximately eighty-five percent of Tijuana’s population is connected to this 
water system.  The remaining population receives water through deliveries by tank trucks.  
Nan Velerio et al., San Diego State Univ. Inst. for Reg’l Studies of the Californias, Map 
4: Water Infrastructure, in SAN DIEGO-TIJUANA INTERNATIONAL BORDER AREA 
PLANNING ATLAS, supra note 28, at 15, 15–16.  For a further discussion of water 
shortage issues, see infra note 278. 
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Clara will be able to provide reclaimed water to maquiladora plants or to 
other industrial or agricultural businesses.176  This in turn will allow 
potable water supplies to be used for other purposes.177 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the more sewage that is treated 
for water reclamation purposes, the less effluent will be discharged 
through the SBOO.  Recall that pursuant to Surfrider’s litigation with the 
USIBWC, studies will soon be under way to determine if effluent from 
the outfall is responsible for exceedances of water quality standards 
along San Diego’s coast.178  Problems arise because sewage from the 
Tijuana region can still be toxic even after secondary treatment.179  
Moreover, the South Bay gyre may be transporting this effluent onto San 
Diego’s beaches.180 
As noted above, if this is the case, the remedial costs of altering the 
SBOO’s discharge point in terms of time and capital will be 
astronomical.181  In the meantime, toxic effluent would continue to 
 
 176. AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-27.  A preliminary study commissioned 
by Agua Clara to investigate the demand for reclaimed water in Tijuana suggests a 
demand of nearly thirteen mgd.  Id.   
 177. Minan, supra note 6, at 66–67. 
 178. See Consent Decree at 10–11, Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed 
Nov. 16, 2003) (No. 99-CV-2441) (current Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree). 
 179. This is due to the large amounts of industrial waste produced from Tijuana’s 
maquiladora industry.  See supra Part I.A.  The EIR, conducted to determine environmental 
impacts of the SBOO, indicated the following: 
The potential impact of the expected elevated toxics/heavy metal content of the 
treated Mexican effluent is considered potentially significant and not mitigated 
at this time.  Total reliance on future source control in Mexico to pretreat 
wastewater prior to conveyance to the IWTP is not sufficiently guaranteed to 
occur such that the impact can be considered mitigated. 
DEV. & ENVTL. PLANNING DIV., supra note 72, at 5.1-16.  Pretreatment is intended to 
limit the discharge of toxic wastes and other materials (such as metals, organics, pH, fats, 
oils, and greases) that interfere with the operation of wastewater treatment facilities.  
AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-30.  While Tijuana has a pretreatment program, 
the necessary facilities have not yet been built.  Id. at 1-29 to 1-30.  Agua Clara has 
stated that a portion of the revenues generated from water reclamation could be used to 
implement pretreatment facilities. 
 180. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (indicating that the city of San 
Diego’s expert consultants did not address the potential onshore transport of SBOO 
effluent and that experts from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography concluded that this 
effluent would reach San Diego’s shoreline in undiluted quantities). 
 181. The SBOO cost approximately $160 million to construct.  JAMIESON, supra 
note 1, at 180.  A boring machine was used to excavate the tunnel.  The outfall 
incorporates a riser structure at the western end of the tunnel, which connects the tunnel 
pipeline to the ocean floor.  Barges were used to install an additional 1.65 miles of 
seafloor pipeline.  These barges then covered the pipeline with 400,000 tons of rock to 
protect exposed piping from ocean waves and ship anchors.  City of San Diego, South 
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impact San Diego’s beaches.  Thus the Bajagua project, with its water 
reclamation capabilities, has the added potential benefit of drastically 
reducing the amount of effluent discharged in such circumstances.182  No 
other alternative offers this benefit. 
Another critical benefit of the Bajagua project is its use of CMA 
ponds technology in attaining secondary treatment standards.183  The 
NEPA litigation led to an in-depth cost-benefit analysis of this technology 
as compared with activated sludge technologies.184  There were several 
key findings.  First, the CMA ponds technology is more efficient in that 
it produces a lesser amount of sludge by-product.185  The significance of 
this benefit can be seen in relation to the sludge produced at the IWTP.  
Pursuant to Minute 283, the Mexican government carries the responsibility 
of disposing of this waste.186  The Mexican government dumps the sludge 
on a mesa adjacent to the San Antonio de los Buenos treatment facility 
near the city of Rosarito.187  From there it flows downwards into the 
Pacific Ocean, causing a potentially adverse impact on Baja Malibu, an 
extremely popular surfing break.188  Thus, a critical component of any 
comprehensive solution must be reducing the production of such waste 
to the greatest possible extent.  The Bajagua project offers this benefit. 
Bajagua also circumvents the problems surrounding the USIBWC’s 
inability to procure funding for a secondary treatment plant.  Under the 
Bajagua project, the Mexican facility will be constructed through a 
design-build-operate189 scheme, with private financing supplied by Agua 
 
Bay Ocean Outfall, at http://www.sannet.gov/mwwd/general/sobayout.shtml (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2003).  Thus, it would be extremely costly and time consuming to deconstruct 
the riser structure and seafloor pipeline, extend the tunnel outside the reach of the South 
Bay gyre, and then reconstruct these facilities. 
 182. AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-16 to 1-17. 
 183. See id. at 1-27. 
 184. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text (indicating that (1) the NEPA 
litigation resulted in a settlement whereby the USIBWC agreed to properly evaluate the 
CMA ponds technology, and (2) based on this study, the USIBWC determined that the 
CMA ponds technology was superior to activated sludge systems). 
 185. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 186. Minute 283, supra note 44, at 5. 
 187. Hearing, supra note 7, at 13, 14 (testimony of Marco A. Gonzalez, Chairman, 
San Diego Surfrider Foundation). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Interview with Gary Sirota, Attorney, Agua Clara LLC, in San Diego, Cal. 
(Feb. 2, 2003).  The design-build-operate scheme is a highly cost-efficient variant of the 
design-bid-build approach to developing public-private projects.  Id.  Design-bid-build is 
“[t]he ‘traditional’ project delivery approach where the owner commissions an architect 
or engineer to prepare drawings and specifications under a design services contract and 
separately contracts for construction by engaging a contractor through competitive 
bidding or negotiating.”  DESIGN-BUILD INST. OF AM., DESIGN-BUILD MANUAL OF PRACTICE 
NO. 103: DESIGN-BUILD DEFINITIONS 1 (1996).  The problem is that this scheme can create a 
liability battle if project complications arise (i.e., the designer will claim that the project 
was negligently constructed while the developer makes similar claims about the design).  
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Clara.190  The USIBWC will then enter into a twenty-year fee-for-services 
contract with Agua Clara.191  Congress has already authorized the 
appropriation of $156 million toward this end in the Tijuana River Act.192 
Another critical benefit of the Bajagua project is its ability to take into 
account the future growth of the Tijuana region.  The Mexican plant 
would be located either on a 200-acre site in eastern Tijuana or on a 163-
acre site just east of the Tijuana River.193  The size of these sites allows for 
the expansion of treatment capacity if needed at a later date.194  The IWTP 
site, on the other hand, cannot expand beyond its current seventy-five 
acres and is limited to the treatment of approximately twenty-five mgd.195  
Accordingly, its ability to account for the future growth of the Tijuana 
region is severely constrained and, as a result, it is not a viable solution. 
Finally, a comparison of the estimated capital costs of each treatment 
alternative further justifies implementation of Bajagua.  The estimated 
construction costs of the three most viable alternatives include the 
Bajagua project at a cost of $103 million,196 an activated sludge treatment 
facility located at the Hoffer site, which is adjacent to the IWTP, at a 
cost of $93 million,197 and a CMA ponds treatment facility located at the 
 
Id.  Design-build schemes offer an advantage here because one entity is singularly 
responsible for both design and construction.  DESIGN-BUILD INST. OF AM., DESIGN-
BUILD MANUAL OF PRACTICE NO. 101: AN INTRODUCTION TO DESIGN-BUILD 2 (1996).  
Furthermore, under design-bid-build schemes, municipalities hire a consulting engineer 
who recommends a design solution but does not have an incentive to make it cost 
effective.  Under the design-bid-operate scheme, on the other hand, one engineer’s 
concept is pitted directly against that of another, creating an incentive to assure cost 
effectiveness.  In addition, engineers, developers, and operators ultimately work as a 
team under a single contract.  Thus, if problems arise, they cannot blame each other.  See 
Steven H. Daniels, A Watershed for Seattle, DESIGN-BUILD MAG., Oct. 1999, at 27, 32.  
The design-bid-operate scheme was first used in the U.S. in the construction of Seattle’s 
Tolt River filtration plant in 1995.  The popularity of the design-bid-operate approach 
has increased dramatically due to the tremendous success and cost-effectiveness of that 
project.  Steven H. Daniels, Master Model Makers, DESIGN-BUILD MAG., Dec. 2000, at 
42, 42–43. 
 190. Bajagua Project, LLC, Project Description, at http://www.bajagua.com/description. 
html (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act of 2000, 22 
U.S.C. § 277d-46 (2000); see infra notes 224–28 (discussing the appropriations process). 
 193. AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31, at 1-9. 
 194. Minan, supra note 6, at 67. 
 195. Id. 
 196. BILL SHUSTER, TIJUANA RIVER VALLEY ESTUARY AND BEACH SEWAGE 
CLEANUP ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-842, pt. 1, at 9 (2000). 
 197. Hearing, supra note 7. 
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same site for $44 million.198  Although Bajagua will require the most 
capital, it will treat twice as much wastewater as the other two 
alternatives.199  Moreover, the inadequacies of the Hoffer site facilities 
would require the construction of additional treatment facilities in the 
near future, resulting in greater overall costs.200 
While the Bajagua project is the most comprehensive solution to 
cross-border sewage problems to date, there are a number of legal 
obstacles that must be overcome before the project can be implemented.  
The next three Sections will examine these obstacles and explain how 
they can be overcome. 
IV.  THE USIBWC: LEGAL OBSTACLES 
It is useful to categorize the legal obstacles that stand in the way of 
implementing the Tijuana River Act and the Bajagua project into two 
categories.  The first set of obstacles stems from the USIBWC’s 
rejection of Bajagua as infeasible and the specific legal arguments 
supporting this claim.  The second set of obstacles, which pose a more 
serious threat to the implementation of Bajagua, stems from the structure 
of the United States government and the difficulties associated with forcing 
the hand of a defiant federal agency.  These obstacles will be addressed in 
Parts V and VI. 
The USIBWC has a great deal of power in influencing implementation 
of the Bajagua project and the Tijuana River Act due to the force of 
Minute 283.201  Recall that this international agreement mandates that 
the United States treat twenty-five mgd via a secondary treatment 
facility located in the United States.202  Accordingly, a new international 
agreement must be negotiated, or in the alternative, Minute 283 must be 
amended.  The Tijuana River Act expressly calls for such treaty 
negotiations so that efforts to realize the implementation of a Mexican 
facility can progress.203  In fact, the Act requests that the Secretary of 
 
 198. Minan, supra note 6, at 65–66. 
 199. As noted above, IWTP treatment alternatives would only treat approximately 
twenty-five mgd.  See supra note 195 and accompanying text.  Bajagua, on the other 
hand, will treat fifty mgd.  See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.  Because 
Bajagua will treat greater amounts of wastewater, it will also have greater operational 
costs.  Minan, supra note 6, at 66. 
 200. Recall that the IWTP site only treats twenty-five mgd and cannot be expanded 
beyond its current seventy-five acres.  See supra note 195 and accompanying text.  
Because the IWTP cannot account for Tijuana’s continuing population growth with this 
limited capacity, additional treatment facilities will need to be built. 
 201. See Minute 283, supra note 44, at 5 (mandating that secondary treatment be 
carried out in the United States). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act of 2000, 22 
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State make it his “highest priority.”204  However, the U.S. section of the 
IBWC is the federal agency responsible for engaging in these 
negotiations, and thus far it has resisted every effort to further the goals 
of the Act.205  Thus, progress in Minute negotiations has been stagnant. 
The Bajagua project was first proposed to the EPA and the USIBWC 
in 1998.206  However, these agencies undertook very little evaluation of 
the Bajagua project.207  Ultimately, these agencies determined that the 
project was not a “reasonable and feasible method[] for substantially 
accomplishing the objective of providing long-term treatment.”208  As 
mentioned above, the USIBWC was prepared to sign a record of 
decision establishing CMA ponds technology at the IWTP as its choice 
for achieving compliance.209  However, San Diego’s local congressional 
delegation, concerned that the USIBWC was in violation of NEPA 
procedures, informed the EPA and the USIBWC that it would not fund a 
CMA ponds system at the IWTP site unless proper objective evaluation 
 
U.S.C. § 277d-45(a) (2000). 
 204. Id.  The Tijuana River Act states the following: 
In light of the existing threat to the environment and to public health and safety 
within the United States as a result of the river and ocean pollution in the San 
Diego-Tijuana border region, the Secretary is requested to give the highest 
priority to the negotiation and execution of a new Treaty Minute, or a 
modification of Treaty Minute 283 . . . in order that the other provisions of 
sections 277d-43 to 277d-46 of this title to address such pollution may be 
implemented as soon as possible. 
Id. 
 205. Brian Bilbray, Border Commission Stalls Progress on Treating Sewage, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 5, 2003, at B13. 
 206. INT’L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY 
AND WATER COMMISSION: SOUTH BAY INTERNATIONAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 
LONG-TERM TREATMENT OPTIONS 1-45 (1998). 
 207. The manner in which the USIBWC and EPA initially received the Bajagua 
project in the draft SEIS is illustrative of their resistance to its implementation and the 
foot-dragging procedures they have employed over the past four years.  In first 
evaluating the project, the federal agencies found the following: 
Although an additional water supply source is needed for the City of Tijuana, 
the Bajagua proposal is currently not endorsed by the Mexican federal 
government. . . . Until EPA and USIBWC are requested by the federal 
Mexican government to consider this project, this proposal cannot be included 
as an alternative . . . .  Also, Minute 283, which was signed by both the United 
States and Mexico, specifically calls for construction of a . . . secondary 
international treatment plant in the United States . . . . 
Id. at 1-46. 
 208. Id. at 1-45. 
 209. See FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, supra note 111, at 1-6; see also supra Part II.B. 
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of all feasible alternatives proved that it was the best option.210 
Subsequently, Agua Clara submitted additional technical information to 
the EPA and the USIBWC.211  However, after reviewing the 
documentation, the agencies again found that the project was an “unfeasible 
and conceptual alternative.”212  The agencies cited several specific problems 
that would have to be overcome before they would consider Bajagua as an 
alternative.  Agua Clara would have to (1) secure new congressional 
legislation that would authorize and appropriate funding to the USIBWC to 
fund the fee-for-services contract, (2) secure new congressional legislation 
that would authorize a sole source contract, and (3) provide explicit 
evidence of Mexico’s approval of the project.213  These problems are 
addressed below. 
A.  The Lack of Congressional Funding for the                                        
Fee-for-Services Contract 
On numerous occasions the USIBWC has contended that a lack of 
congressional funding has prevented it from moving forward with the 
Bajagua project.214  For instance, the current commissioner of the 
USIBWC, Carlos Ramirez,215 has stated that the USIBWC lacks the 
necessary funds to negotiate a new international agreement with 
Mexico.216  Also, in November 2001, Commissioner Ramirez used the 
lack of funding argument as a basis for circumventing both the Tijuana 
River Act and congressional intent by attempting to construct an 
 
 210. Letter from Brian Bilbray and Bob Filner, Congressmen, to Felicia Marcus, 
Regional Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region IX (Mar. 17, 1999) (on file 
with author). 
 211. See generally AGUA CLARA LLC, supra note 31. 
 212. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, supra note 111, at 3-8 to 3-9. 
 213. Id. at 3-9.  The USIBWC and the EPA asserted two other problems that are 
noteworthy.  First, Agua Clara would have to establish “enforceable legal mechanisms” 
to ensure compliance with applicable treatment standards.  Second, Agua Clara would 
have to establish provisions to ensure that the treatment plant would continue to operate 
in the event of bankruptcy.  Id. at 3-10.  Both of these problems do not pose significant 
obstacles to the implementation of Bajagua and can largely be dealt with in the fee-for-
services contract between Agua Clara and the USIBWC, as well as through applicable 
environmental regulations.  Minan, supra note 6, at 73–76. 
 214. See Minan, supra note 6, at 75; see also Congressman Bob Filner, Editorial, 
Bureaucratic Stall, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 4, 2001, at G2. 
 215. Carlos Ramirez was appointed commissioner of the USIBWC in July 2001 by 
President Bush.  Hearing, supra note 7, at 135 (testimony of Carlos M. Ramirez, 
Commissioner, International Boundary and Water Commission).  Prior to that time, 
Commissioner Ramirez had been the Mayor of El Paso for two terms (1997–2001) and received 
both graduate and undergraduate civil engineering degrees from the University of Texas 
at El Paso.  International Boundary and Water Commission, Office of the Commissioner, at 
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/body_body_commissioner.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 216. Leslie Wolf Branscomb, Sludge Process Reconsidered as Sewage Solution, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 25, 2001, at B1. 
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activated sludge secondary treatment plant at the Hoffer site.217  This 
appeared to eliminate years of progress because the USIBWC’s initial 
attempt to implement activated sludge technology was the focus of the 
NEPA litigation back in 1994.218  Due to the fact that the USIBWC 
could not legitimately pursue such an option, it is clear that 
Commissioner Ramirez’s decision was a baseless delay tactic.  Indeed, 
Congress had already expressly stated that it would not lift the 
construction spending cap at the IWTP and that it would not fund a 
secondary treatment plant in the United States.219 
Immediately after Ramirez made his decision, representatives from the 
Tijuana Valley Water District, the City Council, the Regional Chamber of 
Commerce, San Diego County, and the U.S. Congress vehemently 
objected to the USIBWC’s new course of action.220  Since that time, the 
 
 217. Id.; see also Minan, supra note 6, at 75. 
 218. Hearing, supra note 7, at 56, 57 (testimony of Marco A. Gonzalez, Chairman, San 
Diego Surfrider Foundation).  Ramirez’s decision also jeopardized two years of 
negotiations with Surfrider.  Surfrider considered withdrawing its consent decree approval 
with the USIBWC because the agency never disclosed its intention to implement the 
“decidedly unpopular proposal.”  Id. at 57. 
 219. The House stated that there are 
significant concerns which exist regarding the limited capacity of EPA’s 
preferred alternative, the lack of available land on which future capacity could 
be constructed, and its inadequacy in addressing increasing future cross-border 
sewage flows in the region. . . .  [T]here is at least one private sector proposal 
to construct in Mexico similar secondary facilities which would have 
considerably greater potential capacity better suited to the long term sewage 
treatment needs of the rapidly growing border region.  
. . . The conferees thus continue to believe that it would be inappropriate to 
lift the cap at this time or to permit construction of a limited capacity 
secondary treatment facility at the IWTP which would not meet long-term 
sewage treatment needs.  The conferees urge EPA to continue working with 
the IBWC, State Department, and its counterparts in Mexico to encourage and 
develop such a viable proposal in a timely manner. 
H.R. REP NO. 106-988, at 132–33 (2000). 
 220. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 58–61 (statement of Congressman Duncan 
Hunter) (explaining that Congress already considered and discarded the activated sludge 
alternative as inferior in terms of cost and capacity and inappropriate in terms of 
location); see also id. at 7–9 (testimony of Art Letter, General Manager, Tijuana Valley 
County Water District) (arguing that the USIBWC is engaging in bureaucratic processes 
to delay progress of Bajagua); Letter from Ralph Inzunza, Councilmember, City of San 
Diego, District Eight, to Carlos Ramirez, Commissioner, USIBWC (Nov. 7, 2001) (on 
file with author) (expressing strong concern over Ramirez’s decision and the lack of 
progress by the USIBWC to implement the Tijuana River Act); Letter from Greg Cox, 
First District Supervisor, San Diego County Board of Supervisors, to Carlos Ramirez, 
Commissioner, USIBWC (Nov. 8, 2001) (on file with author) (expressing the need to 
“look beyond just providing secondary treatment” and take advantage of the superior 
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USIBWC has ceased to pursue activated sludge technology at the Hoffer 
site.   However, the argument that there is a lack of funding still poses a 
significant threat to implementation of the Bajagua project.  This is 
evinced by the force majeure clause contained in the State-USIBWC 
consent decree.  The consent decree defined a force majeure event as 
“any occurrence arising from causes outside the control of [the 
USIBWC] that delays or prevents compliance with [the] Decree.”221  As 
with the original Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree, the USIBWC 
contended that a lack of funding constituted a force majeure event.222 
There is no doubt that, at trial, the USIBWC will continue to claim 
that a lack of congressional funding prevents it from implementing the 
Tijuana River Act.  If the USIBWC is successful in presenting this 
argument, it would then be able to continue operating the IWTP in 
violation of state and federal law for an indefinite period of time.223 
To understand the basis of the lack of funds argument, it is necessary 
to look at the annual appropriations cycle224 and, more specifically, at 
 
benefits offered by Bajagua); Letter from Jessie J. Knight, Jr., President and CEO, San 
Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce, to Carlos Ramirez, Commissioner, USIBWC 
(Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with author) (expressing concern that the decision will result in 
protracted delays and directly impact human health, environmental pollution, and water 
availability). 
 221. Consent Decree at 9, Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 
1999) (No. 99-CV-2441) (current State-USIBWC consent decree). 
 222. Id. at 10.  In the original Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree, the USIBWC 
contended that a force majeure event included its 
financial inability to achieve by January 22, 2003 compliance with the 
Applicable Effluent Standards and Limitations because performance of this 
obligation is subject to the fiscal and procurement laws and regulations of the 
United States . . . ; sufficient funds may not be appropriated by Congress; and 
Congress may not authorize appropriated funds to be available for 
expenditure . . . . 
Consent Decree at 9, Surfrider Found. v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-
CV-2441) (rescinded Surfrider-USIBWC consent decree). 
 223. The Anti-Deficiency Act, which is designed to limit spending by federal 
agencies and facilitate management of the budget, is relevant here.  It provides that 
federal officers may not involve the “government in a contract or obligation for the 
payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law.”  31 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (2000).  However, Congress has the power to eliminate concerns raised by the 
Anti-Deficiency Act.  Minan, supra note 6, at 69.  It seems clear that Congress did so by 
enacting the provisions in the Tijuana River Act concerning the amortized fee-for-
services contract. 
 224. The annual appropriations cycle is as follows: (1) The President submits his 
annual budget for the upcoming fiscal year (October 1 to September 30) to Congress in 
early February.  It recommends spending levels for various federal agencies and 
programs in the form of  “budget authority.”   Budget authority permits federal agencies 
to make obligations that require expenditures.  These obligations result in outlays, which 
are basically payments from the Treasury.  (2) Congress adopts a budget resolution, 
which distributes the total new budget authority and outlays for each fiscal year covered 
by the resolution among the committees with jurisdiction over spending, including the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees.  Through this allocation process, the budget 
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the congressional funding process.  Congress funds federal agencies 
primarily through a formal appropriation process225 that consists of two 
sequential steps.226  First, Congress must enact an authorizing measure 
that generally creates or continues to fund an existing agency or 
program and authorizes a subsequent appropriation.227  Congress took 
this initial step when it authorized the appropriation of $156 million to 
carry out the goals of the Tijuana River Act.  Second, Congress must 
enact an appropriations measure to provide funding for the authorized 
 
resolution sets total spending ceilings for each committee.  (3) The House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees then divide their allocations among their subcommittees 
(there are thirteen in each house), which hold detailed hearings on the agencies’ 
justifications for the funding.  Each House subcommittee is paired with its Senate 
counterpart, both having jurisdiction over the same agencies and programs.  (4) Once 
these hearings are complete, each subcommittee submits a draft bill to its respective full 
committee.  The full committees may adopt amendments to these bills.  (5) The bills are 
then submitted to their respective floors for action.  When the bill is on the floor, 
Representatives or Senators have an opportunity to propose floor amendments.  (6) 
Meetings follow to negotiate differences between the House- and Senate-passed bills.  
The bills will then be adopted, rejected, or resubmitted for further consideration.  If a bill 
is rejected or resubmitted then further negotiations ensue.  (7) When both houses agree to 
the entire text of the bill, the measure is sent to the President to be signed.  He has ten 
days to sign or veto the measure.  If he takes no action then the bill automatically 
becomes law at the end of the ten-day period.  Much of the cycle is regulated by the 
Budget Enforcement Act.  Sandy Streeter, The Congressional Appropriations Process: 
An Introduction, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 2-18 (2002). 
 225. Power over appropriations is granted to the legislative branch by the U.S. 
Constitution: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  However, the actual 
appropriations process is derived from specific House and Senate rules.  Bill Heniff, Jr., 
Overview of the Authorization-Appropriation Process, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1 (2001). 
 226. The two stage process generally applies to discretionary spending rather than 
mandatory spending.  Discretionary spending provides funds for a wide variety of 
activities from national defense to education.  Mandatory spending provides funds for 
entitlement programs.  Entitlements are statutory requirements that the federal government 
commit funds to individuals and government units that meet eligibility requirements; 
examples include Social Security and Medicare benefits.  Certain entitlement appropriations 
do follow the two stage process.  Streeter, supra note 224, at 11–13. 
 227. Heniff, supra note 225, at 1. 
An authorizing measure can establish, continue, or modify an agency or 
program for a fixed or indefinite period of time.  It also may set forth the duties 
and functions of an agency or program, its organizational structure, and the 
responsibilities of agency or program officials. 
 Authorizing legislation also authorizes the enactment of appropriations for 
an agency or program. . . .  The authorization of appropriations is intended to 
provide guidance regarding the appropriate amount of funds to carry out the 
authorized activities of an agency. 
Id. at 2. 
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agency or program.228  Congress has not yet appropriated the budget 
authority that will allow the USIBWC to make payments under the fee-
for-services contract.  This point forms the foundation of the lack of 
funds argument against implementation of the Bajagua project. 
Some case law lends support to the contention that a lack of funding 
allows a federal agency to extend compliance with statutory provisions 
beyond specified deadlines.  In Environmental Defense Center v. 
Babbitt,229 the Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of the Interior and 
the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service were given an extended 
period of time to comply with mandates of the Endangered Species Act 
due to an appropriations act that temporarily limited the necessary 
funding to carry out their duties.230  However, Babbit can be 
distinguished from the present situation. In Babbitt, Congress enacted 
specific legislation that cut back on federal funding that was previously 
available;231 in the USIBWC’s case, Congress has taken no such action. 
Moreover, current circumstances indicate that it will be difficult for the 
USIBWC to show that a present lack of funding precludes implementation 
of a Mexico-based treatment facility.  Congress overwhelmingly supports 
Bajagua and has indicated that the next immediate step is to negotiate a 
new international agreement with Mexico.232  This is reflected in the 
language of the Tijuana River Act, which directs the USIBWC to 
negotiate a new treaty minute, enter into the fee-for-services contract with 
the owner of the Mexican facility, and then “make payments under such 
contract.”233   
In other words, the USIBWC and Agua Clara must enter into the 
contract before payments will be made.  One of the Act’s main purposes 
is to circumvent the immediate need for congressional funding by 
allowing the project to be built with private funding.  The USIBWC will 
make amortized payments to the owner of the Mexican facility over the 
next 20 years but requires no appropriation at the present time.234  As 
 
 228. Id. at 1.  “An appropriation measure provides budget authority to an agency for 
specified purposes.”  Id. at 2.  For a detailed discussion of appropriation measures and 
budget authority, see generally Streeter, supra note 224; see also Heniff, supra note 225. 
 229. 73 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 230. Id. at 872. 
 231. Id. at 869–70. 
 232. See infra note 292 (indicating Congress’s frustration with the USIBWC’s lack 
of progress in completing treaty minute negotiations). 
 233. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 234. See BILL SHUSTER, TIJUANA RIVER VALLEY ESTUARY AND BEACH SEWAGE 
CLEANUP ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-842, pt. 1, at 9 (2000) (indicating that the fee-
for-services contract will be characterized as a lease purchase and, as such, budget 
authority will be scored when annual payments become due); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-11: PREPARATION, 
SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET pt. 2 app. at B-7 to B-8 (2002) (indicating 
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such, the fact that Congress has not appropriated the $156 million 
authorized in the Tijuana River Act has no bearing on the USIBWC’s 
ability to proceed with the Mexican alternative. 
B.  The Lack of Congressional Funding                                                  
for Preliminary Studies 
The USIBWC has recently raised another argument relating to 
congressional funding.  According to the USIBWC, the U.S. and 
Mexican sections of the commission feel that “planning level studies are 
needed to address technical and financial issues that would provide a 
framework for a minute.”235  The USIBWC requested $3 million in 
congressional funding to this effect.236  When this request was denied, 
the USIBWC went so far as to claim that the financial impact of the war 
in Iraq was responsible for the denial and that it was accordingly unable 
to proceed with minute negotiations.237 
The USIBWC has claimed that a lack of funding for preliminary 
studies has prevented treaty minute negotiations in the past.  For 
example, in December 2001, a congressional hearing was held before the 
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment of the Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure to determine why implementation 
of the Tijuana River Act had not moved forward.238  At the hearing, 
Commissioner Ramirez claimed the USIBWC needed money for 
preliminary environmental studies.239  After the Commissioner made this 
statement, his U.S. State Department superior, the Director of the Office 
of Mexican Affairs, informed Congress that no additional funding was 
necessary.240  Thus, the validity of the USIBWC’s recent claim that it 
requires funding is in doubt. 
Regardless, the USIBWC does have other sources of funding at its 
disposal.  Recall that the USIBWC and the city of San Diego jointly 
 
that agency debt in terms of outlays is to be redeemed “over the lease payment period 
according to an amortization schedule”). 
 235. E-mail from Sally Spener to Author, supra note 165. 
 236. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice of Facts in Support of Motion to Enter 
Consent Decree and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 2, 
Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 237. Leslie Wolf Branscomb, Sewage Treatment Project Put on Hold, No Money 
for Border-Area Plant, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 24, 2003, at B1. 
 238. See generally Hearing, supra note 7, at 5 (testimony of Congressman Bob Filner). 
 239. Id. at 26. 
 240. Id. 
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constructed the SBOO.241  The City set aside contingency funds in the 
event any lawsuits arose out of the SBOO’s construction.242  A lawsuit 
did in fact arise and is currently pending in the California Court of 
Appeal.243  In December 2001, the City contacted the USIBWC, stating 
that a portion of the approximately $6.3 million in contingency funds 
could be used to begin implementation of the Tijuana River Act.244  
Rather than pursuing the use of such funds, the USIBWC continues to 
unnecessarily delay treaty minute negotiations.245 
Furthermore, Agua Clara has offered to pay for any necessary 
preliminary studies.246  The USIBWC can and should use Agua Clara’s 
funding to conduct the preliminary studies and then repay these funds 
over the life of the contract.  In fact, the contract provisions of the 
Tijuana River Act explicitly account for this scenario.  The Act directs 
the USIBWC to pay the owner of the Mexican facility an annual amount 
that reflects “all agreed upon costs associated with the development 
[and] construction . . . of the Mexican facility.”247  As such, the 
USIBWC’s claim that it cannot proceed with negotiations because of a 
lack of funding for preliminary studies is without merit. 
C.  The Competition in Contracting Act 
The second argument that the USIBWC has put forth in resisting 
implementation of Bajagua involves the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA).248  The USIBWC argues that CICA prevents it from entering into 
the fee-for-services contract prescribed in the Tijuana River Act.249  CICA 
requires that “an executive agency in conducting a procurement for property 
or services . . . shall obtain full and open competition through the use of 
 
 241. See supra Part II. 
 242. Letter from Scott Tulloch, Director, City of San Diego, to Carlos Ramirez, 
Commissioner, International Boundary and Water Commission (Dec. 7, 2001) (on file 
with author). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. According to the USIBWC, a number of obstacles would need to be overcome 
in pursuing these funds.  First, the city of San Diego would have to obtain the EPA’s 
approval before dispersing the funds to the USIBWC.  Second, the funds were originally 
appropriate for use at the IWTP site.  As such, it is unclear whether the USIBWC can use 
these funds to implement a facility in Mexico.  The USIBWC is uncertain whether these 
obstacles can be overcome because it has never tried.  Telephone Interview with Mario 
Lewis, Office of the Staff Counsel, International Boundary and Water Commission (July 
11, 2003). 
 246. Interview with Gary Sirota, supra note 189. 
 247. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(2) (2000). 
 248. 41 U.S.C. § 253. 
 249. For additional analysis of CICA and its relation to the Tijuana River Act, see 
Minan, supra note 6, at 70–72. 
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competitive procedures.”250  In other words, CICA requires “full and open 
competition in soliciting offers and awarding government contracts.”251  
Thus, because the Bajagua project is the only proposal that satisfies the 
mandates of the Tijuana River Act, the USIBWC has claimed that the 
requirements of CICA are not met and, as a result, it does not have the 
authority to contract with Agua Clara.252 
While there is some limited support for this contention, it is ultimately 
incorrect.  The mandates of CICA can be circumvented though a number 
of different avenues.  For instance, one possible exception, which has 
been the focus of the CICA debate, is section (c)(5).  This section holds 
that CICA’s sole sourcing requirements do not apply when “a statute 
expressly authorizes or requires that the procurement be made through 
another executive agency or from a specified source.”253  However, 
CICA lists very specific requirements that must be met before any such 
legislation can be “construed as requiring a new contract to be awarded 
to a specified non-Federal Government entity.”254  As Professor John 
Minan of the University of San Diego School of Law has noted, there is 
a strong argument that the Tijuana River Act has failed to provide the 
required specificity.255  The Act states that the USIBWC may enter into a 
 
 250. 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1)(A). 
 251. Minan, supra note 6, at 68. 
 252. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EIS, supra note 111, at 4-31. 
 253. 41 U.S.C § 253(c)(5); see also Minan, supra note 6, at 72. 
 254. Section (i) of CICA holds: 
(1) It is the policy of Congress that an executive agency should not be 
required by legislation to award a new contract to a specific non-Federal 
Government entity.  It is further the policy of Congress that any program, 
project, or technology identified in legislation be procured though merit-
based selection procedures. 
(2) A provision of law may not be construed as requiring a new contract to be 
awarded to a specified non-Federal Government entity unless that 
provision of law– 
(A)  specifically refers to this subsection; 
(B) specifically identifies the particular non-Federal Government entity 
involved; and 
(C) specifically states that the award to that entity is required by such 
provision of law in contravention of the policy set forth in paragraph (1). 
41 U.S.C. § 253(i). 
 255. Minan, supra note 6, at 71–72.  Professor Minan was a trial attorney in the 
Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and a law professor at the University of 
Toledo before he started teaching at the University of San Diego School of Law in 1977.  
He teaches and writes in the areas of land use planning, property, water rights, and 
comparative law.  He is also nationally recognized for his work in solar energy law.  See 
University of San Diego School of Law, John H. Minan, at http://www.sandiego.edu/ 
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contract with the owner of a Mexican treatment facility, 
“notwithstanding any provision of Federal procurement law.”256 
It is important to note, however, that there is support for the position 
that a “notwithstanding” clause may override broad regulatory schemes 
such as those of CICA.257  Furthermore, the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) has found that the “notwithstanding” provision “quite 
clearly permits the [IBWC] to sole source the contract.”258  The CRS 
works exclusively for members of Congress and congressional 
committees and was created for the sole purpose of providing Congress  
with “comprehensive and reliable analysis, research and information 
services that are timely, objective, nonpartisan, and confidential.”259 
While reports issued by the CRS are not binding, they are commonly 
used as persuasive authority.260  Congress has shown impatience with the 
USIBWC’s attempts to use CICA as a means to avoid implementation of 
Bajagua and has relied on the CRS report in informing Commissioner 
Ramirez that the Tijuana River Act authorizes the USIBWC to sole 
source the contract.261 
In battling over whether the exception found in section (c)(5) applies 
to the Bajagua situation, both the USIBWC and Congress are off base.  
Even if the (c)(5) exception does not apply to the Bajagua situation, 
CICA contains numerous other exceptions that may be invoked.  For 
instance, section (c)(1) states that an executive agency may use 
noncompetitive procedures when the “services needed by the executive 
agency are available from only one responsible source and no other type 
of property or services will satisfy the needs of the executive agency.”262  
This exception clearly applies to the Bajagua situation because Agua 
 
usdlaw/profs/minan.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 256. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(c)(1). 
 257. See Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 547–48 (1955). 
 258. Memorandum from John R. Luckey, Legislative Attorney, Congressional 
Research Service, to Bob Filner (May 10, 2002) (on file with author). 
 259. See Congressional Research Service, What’s CRS, at http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/ 
whatscrs.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2003). 
 260. See, e.g., Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens, 831 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 
1987); Moorhead v. United States, 774 F.2d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 261. After calling Commissioner Ramirez to a meeting in Washington, D.C. to 
address the USIBWC’s failure to comply with the Tijuana River Act, Congress informed 
Commissioner Ramirez that the Tijuana River Act 
clearly provides the authority to the IBWC to directly contract with the owner 
of the Mexican facility.  In fact, the exemption from the federal acquisition 
regulations was specifically added to allow for this opportunity.  Further, the 
Congressional Research Service’s legal opinion, which is enclosed, should 
suffice as proof of the IBWC’s ability to move forward in consultations with 
the Bajagua Project. 
Letter from San Diego Congressional Delegation to Carlos Ramirez, Commissioner, 
International Boundary and Water Commission (July 29, 2002) (on file with author). 
 262. 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(1) (2000). 
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Clara is the only entity that can supply the USIBWC with the services 
required to carry out the Tijuana River Act. 
A further exception may be invoked when “the head of the executive 
agency . . . determines that it is necessary in the public interest to use 
procedures other than competitive procedures . . . and . . . notifies the 
Congress in writing of such determination.”263  This exception demonstrates 
the absurdity of the USIBWC claim that it lacks the authority to contract 
with Agua Clara.  It is clear that the USIBWC is doing all it can to resist 
implementation of the Tijuana River Act.  If the USIBWC is serious 
about following Congress’s directive, then CICA should not be an 
obstacle to implementation of the Bajagua project. 
D.  The Lack of Mexican Support 
In addition to the above arguments, the USIBWC has claimed that the 
Mexican government does not support the Bajagua project.264  The 
specific legal problem that arises in this context is straightforward: If the 
Mexican government is unwilling to renegotiate treaty Minute 283, then 
the U.S. federal government is powerless to implement a secondary 
treatment facility on Mexican soil.265 
While Mexico initially was skeptical of a solution inapposite to the 
mandates of Minute 283,266 it has since shown broad support for 
 
 263.  Id. § 253(c)(7)(A)–(B). 
 264. USIBWC’s Response to Second Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to 
Allow Agua Clara LLC to Participate Amicus Curiae and Opposition of USIBWC to 
Request for Judicial Notice Regarding Second Supplemental Brief at 6, Surfrider Found. 
v. Bernal (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441). 
 265. See Minute 283, supra note 44, at 5 (mandating that secondary treatment be 
conducted in the United States). 
 266. For instance, in 1999, the Commissioner of the Mexican IBWC (which is 
known as the Comisión Internacional de Límites y Agua, or CILA) conveyed the 
following message to the USIBWC: 
Because of the present primary treatment module operating conditions, we 
consider it inappropriate to continue to postpone the construction of a 
secondary module [at] . . . the international plant [IWTP].  Thus we respectfully 
request that your government conform to the terms agreed to in Minute No. 
283 of the Commission for the benefit of the sanitary conditions in the area and 
inhabitants on both sides of the border. 
Letter from J. Arturo Herrera Solís, Commissioner, Comisión Internacional de Límites y 
Agua, to John Bernal, U.S. Commissioner, International Boundary and Water 
Commission (Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with author).  This decision may have been 
influenced by the fact that the USIBWC informed Mexican officials that $9 million in 
EPA funding would be available for improving Tijuana’s wastewater infrastructure if a 
ponds facility were constructed in the United States but not if the facility were 
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Bajagua.267  For instance, Ernesto Ruffo, the Commissioner of Northern 
Border Affairs for Mexico, has expressed the Mexican government’s full 
support of the Bajagua project.268  In other circumstances, Mexican 
officials have worked with Agua Clara representatives to establish a 
logistical framework for moving forward with Bajagua.269  Nevertheless, 
despite these indications, the USIBWC has asserted that Mexico is not a 
“Bajagua supporter”270 and has publicly used this claim to shed doubt on 
negotiations for a new treaty minute in the past.271  While it is already 
clear that the argument lacks merit, steps should be taken to permanently 
foreclose the issue.  This can be accomplished through the Mexican 
government’s issuance of a concession agreement. 
A concession agreement is generally defined as “a license granted by a 
sovereign government to a foreign corporation or business for the 
express purpose of exploiting a natural resource, developing a geographic 
area, or pursuing some particular venture, for which the government 
desires the corporation’s expertise, assets, technology, or capital.”272  
 
constructed in Mexico.  See Letter from Arturo Herrera Solís, Commissioner, Comisión 
Internacional de Límites y Agua, to John Bernal, U.S. Commissioner, International 
Boundary and Water Commission (Aug. 30, 1999) (on file with author); see also Letter 
from John Bernal, U.S. Commissioner, International Boundary and Water Commission, 
to Arturo Herrera Solís, Commissioner, Comisión Internacional de Límites y Agua (Sept. 
2, 1999) (on file with author) (confirming the $9 million offer). 
 267. Filner, supra note 214. 
 268. Hearing, supra note 7, at 18. 
 269. Letter from Arturo Herrera Solís, Commissioner, Internacional de Límites y 
Agua, to Carlos Ramirez, Commissioner, International Boundary and Water Commission 
(May 3, 2002) (on file with author) (seeking ratification of the plan designed to implement 
Bajagua); Declaration of F. David Schlesinger in Support of Reply to USIBWC’s 
Response to Second Supplemental Brief and Opposition to Request for Judicial Notice at 
1–2, Surfrider Found. v. Ramirez (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1999) (No. 99-CV-2441) 
(discussing the federal water authority’s designation of Comisión Estatal de Servicios 
Públicos de Tijuana as the local agency to coordinate with Bajagua). 
 270. USIBWC’s Response to Second Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to 
Allow Agua Clara LLC to Participate Amicus Curiae and Opposition of USIBWC to 
Request For Judicial Notice Regarding Second Supplemental Brief, Ramirez (No. 99-
CV-2441). 
 271. Ken Ellingwood, Sewage Cleanup Is Focus of Talks, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, 
at B1; Filner, supra note 214. 
 272. Viktor Soloveytchik, New Perspectives for Concession Agreements: A 
Comparison of Hungarian Law and the Draft Laws of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, 
16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 261, 263 n.1 (1993) (citing KENNETH W. DAM, OIL RESOURCES: 
WHO GETS WHAT HOW 12–18 (1976)).  Latin American governments began to open their 
markets to attract foreign investment into the infrastructure development and operation sectors 
in the early 1990s.  Quirico G. Seriñá, An Overview of the Legal Aspects of Concession 
Agreements in Latin America, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 371 (1998).  This came 
largely in response to their nations’ own increasing demands for improved infrastructure.  
Id.  Mexico first issued concessions in order to better develop its airport and railroad 
systems in 1995.  Id. at 374.  Mexico has since opened other markets to private 
investment, such as the transportation and distribution of natural gas and electricity, oil 
exploration and the operation of petrochemical plants, the operation of port facilities, and 
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The holding corporation then operates the infrastructure facilities or 
project for a specified number of years, allowing it to recuperate its 
investment costs by collecting the profits generated from those 
operations.273  In the context of the cross-border sewage dilemma, Mexico 
would enter into a concession agreement with a private entity granting 
the rights to develop and operate a wastewater treatment and reclamation 
facility, as well as the land upon which the facility and infrastructure 
will be built.274  The granting of these rights would unequivocally resolve 
Mexico’s support for Bajagua. 
However, progress in attaining the concession recently met with 
political complications.  Mexico’s National Water Commission tentatively 
denied granting the concession because Minute 283 had not been 
renegotiated,275 and accordingly, the “applicable legal framework necessary 
to support [the concession] is not in existence.”276 
Despite these setbacks, there is still a strong indication that Mexico 
will grant the concession.  First, the Mexican government must 
recognize Tijuana’s imminent water shortage277 and that demand for 
water will increase dramatically over the next twenty years.278  Second, 
under the concession agreement, Agua Clara would finance the 
construction and operation of the water reclamation facility through the 
 
telephone and satellite services.  Id. at 373–74. 
 273. For an example of this from Mexico, see Seriñá, supra note 272, at 374. 
 274. The concession would most likely contain a clause that conditioned the 
granting of these rights upon renegotiation of an international treaty minute.  Interview 
with Gary Sirota, supra note 189.  Thus, the USIBWC could still attempt to hinder 
negotiations, but could not assert a lack of Mexican support as a reason for doing so. 
 275. Letter from Jose Carlos Sanchez, Engineer, National Water Commission, to 
Federico Manuel Ruanova Guinea (Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with author). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See supra note 175. 
 278. Studies conducted by San Diego State University (SDSU) have shown that 
“the entire San Diego-Tijuana region will experience a significant growth in demand for 
potable water over the next 20 years. Finding sources of water to meet projected 
planning area and regional demands will be a major challenge for the binational 
community.”  SDSU studies further found that the irregularity of water supply “will be 
problematic until supply is expanded through reclaimed water, desalinization, and 
completion of the new aqueduct from the Colorado River.”  Velerio et al., supra note 
175.  Recall that, through water reclamation, the Bajagua project can help free up potable 
water supplies by providing reclaimed water for agricultural and industrial purposes.  See 
supra Part III.  Note that pursuant to international treaty, the United States is obligated to 
deliver 1.85 cubic kilometers of Colorado River water to Mexico annually.  PETER H. 
GLEICK ET AL., THE WORLD’S WATER 2002–2003: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON 
FRESHWATER RESOURCES 137–38 (2002). 
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design-build-operate scheme discussed above,279 and would then 
recuperate its costs through the fee-for-services contract with the U.S. 
federal government.  In other words, no Mexican financing would be 
required.  As such, Mexico would be able to increase its water supply and 
improve its wastewater infrastructure without facing the financial 
barriers that have haunted it in the past.280  These factors suggest that the 
Mexican government is still willing to issue a concession to Agua 
Clara in the near future. 
Thus, as demonstrated above, the specific legal obstacles erected by 
the USIBWC can be overcome.  However, beyond this, other, more 
difficult problems may arise from the foundational tenants of our legal 
system, including the separation of powers doctrine and the recognition 
of sovereign immunity. 
V.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity281 is particularly significant in the 
context of cross-border sewage issues because it may provide the federal 
government a license to violate state and federal environmental laws 
without having to face serious consequences.  For instance, the State of 
California has attempted to impose civil penalties on the USIBWC in the 
past but has been unsuccessful.  Recall that as soon as the USIBWC began 
operations at the ITWP, it was in violation of state and federal law.282  
The Regional Board then issued cease and desist order number 96-52 to 
extend the USIBWC’s compliance schedule.283  After the USIBWC 
made no effort to comply, the Regional Board issued an addendum to 
the cease and desist order284 that gave the USIBWC less than two 
months to comply with its NPDES permit, and ordered the USIBWC to 
pay $60,000 for each day it continued to operate in violation of its 
permit.285  The USIBWC has never paid. 
These problems involving sovereign immunity are likely to resurface 
at trial.  The concern is that the USIBWC could simply disregard any 
court-imposed compliance deadlines, continue to violate treatment 
 
 279. See supra Part III. 
 280. See supra note 27. 
 281. The doctrine generally holds that a government is immune from being sued in 
its own courts without its consent.  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 
(1994).  Plaintiffs who bring suit against the government carry the burden of proving that 
the government has waived its immunity.  Congress can waive sovereign immunity via 
statute.  Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 282. See supra Part II.C. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., San Diego Region, Addendum No. 3 
to Cease and Desist Order No. 96-52 (2000). 
 285. Id. at 6. 
CAMPBELL.DOC 1/14/2020  1:36 PM 
[VOL. 40:  1039, 2003]  The Bajagua Project 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1087 
regulations, and then claim that it has not waived its sovereign 
immunity. 
On the issue of sovereign immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Department of Energy v. Ohio286 is directly on point.  In that 
case, Ohio brought suit against the Department of Energy, seeking civil 
penalties for past violations of the Clean Water Act.287  At issue was the 
federal facilities provision of the Clean Water Act,288 which seemed to 
waive sovereign immunity by subjecting federal agencies to the same 
sanctions as nongovernmental entities.  However, the Court went out of 
its way to interpret the word “sanction” in a coercive sense, precluding 
the possibility of seeking punitive fines for prior violations.289  The 
Court ultimately held that the United States has not waived sovereign 
immunity for punitive fines.290 
Thus, the State of California can seek fines to coerce the USIBWC 
into future compliance but cannot seek punitive fines for past violations.  
Problematically, the state’s effort to impose coercive fines may be 
construed as an attempt to punish the USIBWC for its past violations.  
This is especially possible given the Court’s restrictive interpretation in 
Department of Energy v. Ohio.  Thus, while coercive penalties should be 
sought in the event that the USIBWC defies the court’s order, further 
congressional action should be taken to bring about the USIBWC’s 
compliance.  Congress may have the power to guide the USIBWC’s hand 
into action. 
VI.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
It is clear that the legislative and executive branches have adopted 
drastically different political strategies for resolving the cross-border 
sewage crisis between Tijuana and San Diego.  Congress is committed to 
implementing the Bajagua project as the Mexican facility called for in 
 
 286. 503 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 287. Id. at 612. 
 288. This section states: 
Each department, agency, or instrumentality . . . of the Federal Government . . . 
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local 
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting 
the control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner . . . as any 
nongovernmental entity. 
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000). 
 289. Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. at 623. 
 290. Id. at 626–27. 
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the Tijuana River Act.291  The USIBWC has resisted the efforts in direct 
defiance of congressional directives.292  As such, the looming issue is 
whether Congress has the power to force the USIBWC to implement 
Bajagua.293 
In this regard, the separation of powers doctrine294 poses a significant 
obstacle.  It is well-established that the legislature cannot step into the 
shoes of the executive branch and directly implement the law.  However, 
Congress does have a number of tools that can be used to check 
executive actions and ensure effective legislation.  These tools allow 
Congress to indirectly force federal agencies to execute the law as 
prescribed.   
While Congress does not have the power to remove executive 
officials,295 it can conduct investigations and hold those who refuse to 
answer congressional inquiries in contempt.296  Congress has already 
exercised this power by summoning Commissioner Ramirez to testify 
before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment at the 
end of 2001.297  Commissioner Ramirez’s effort to implement activated 
sludge technologies at the Hoffer site prompted Congressmen Bob Filner 
 
 291. This commitment is being tested.  As will be discussed below, further 
congressional action is necessary to overcome the separation of powers issue. 
 292. The local congressional delegation responded to Commissioner Ramirez’s 
continued delays in this way: 
We continue to be frustrated by the lack of progress being made by the 
[IBWC] to complete negotiations of the amended treaty minute with Mexico, 
and ultimately, the continued delays over addressing the raw sewage flowing 
out onto our San Diego beaches. . . .  [I]t is nearly two years since the [Tijuana 
River Act] was unanimously passed and signed into law and still there is no 
appreciable sign that it will be implemented any time soon. 
Letter from San Diego Congressional Delegation to Carlos Ramirez, supra note 261. 
 293. One problem in this respect is that while the legislators that enacted the 
Tijuana River Act have been active in advocating its implementation, congressional 
statements made after enactment of the statute are given little legal weight.  Northwest 
Forest Res. Council v. Pilchuck Audubon Soc’y, 97 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 973 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 294. Congress did not expressly mention Bajagua in the Tijuana River Act.  In 
addition, the plain language of the statute does not force the USIBWC to proceed with a 
Mexican facility.  The Act states that “[s]ubject to the negotiation of a new Treaty 
Minute” the USIBWC “may” enter the fee-for-services contract.  22 U.S.C. § 277d-44 
(2000).  Commissioner Ramirez has used this language to argue that he is not required to 
implement Bajagua.   
 295. The Constitution does not explicitly mention the removal power.  However, 
constitutional jurisprudence indicates that the President has a broad power to remove 
executive officials.  Congress can limit that power in certain narrow situations.  See 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–93 (1988); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 
353 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926). 
 296. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187–88 (1957). 
 297. Hearing, supra note 7, at 2 (testimony of Congressman Duncan Hunter). 
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to suggest that Ramirez be held in contempt.298  However, there are 
fairly strict requirements for holding someone in contempt.299  In 
addition, the Republican party would probably resist this course of action, 
given that Commissioner Ramirez was appointed by President Bush. 
Congress should further exercise its investigative power in order to 
compel Commissioner Ramirez’s compliance.  A more comprehensive 
investigation may reveal concrete evidence that the USIBWC is 
intentionally circumventing the Tijuana River Act.  At the very least, the 
increased pressure could deter Commissioner Ramirez from employing 
further delay tactics. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The decades-old cross border sewage dilemma is still far from being 
resolved.  The Bajagua project will provide the most comprehensive 
solution to the crisis because it is cost-efficient, can support the future 
growth of the Tijuana region, has the capability to increase Tijuana’s 
water supply, and incorporates the most effective technologies. 
Perhaps the most significant Bajagua project benefit is water 
reclamation.  First, this would provide a source of tertiary water for 
agricultural and industrial uses in Mexico.  Second, and more importantly, 
current oceanographic data suggests that the South Bay gyre may 
transport effluent from the SBOO to San Diego’s shoreline.  The 
oceanographic studies conducted under the Surfrider-USIBWC consent 
decree will be critical in verifying this information.  If effluent from the 
SBOO is being transported to shore, the Bajagua project will alleviate 
the problem.  The more effluent that is treated to tertiary levels, the less 
effluent will be discharged from the SBOO and onto San Diego’s 
beaches.  No other alternative in the region offers these benefits. 
The Tijuana River Act was enacted on November 7, 2000.  Almost 
four years have passed, and the USIBWC continues to make excuses for 
why it cannot proceed with treaty minute negotiations and implementation 
of the Act.  As has been shown, the individual arguments made by the 
USIBWC can be overcome.  Problematically, as soon as one argument is 
addressed, the USIBWC raises others in its place.  Therefore, a 
resolution to the sewage crisis can only be reached through direct 
judicial and congressional action. 
 
 298. Id. at 27. 
 299. 2 U.S.C. § 192. 
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California’s lawsuit against the USIBWC and the potential for 
coercive sanctions may play a critical role in bringing about the 
USIBWC’s compliance.  However, California’s ability to impose these 
sanctions is questionable, especially given the Supreme Court’s 
restrictive interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s federal facilities 
provision in Department of Energy v. Ohio.  As such, it may ultimately 
be up to Congress to resolve the sewage crisis.  The USIBWC has 
continually defied the will of Congress as expressed in the Tijuana River 
Act.  It is testing Congress’s commitment to the Act as well as its 
legislative authority.  As was noted above, Congress has the power to 
ensure that its laws are executed as prescribed.  In this vein, Congress must 
continue to exercise its investigational power.  A thorough investigation 
will, in all likelihood, reveal direct evidence that the USIBWC has 
intentionally prevented implementation of the Tijuana River Act and 
provide a basis for holding Commissioner Ramirez and USIBWC 
officials in contempt of Congress.  These drastic measures must be used 
to put an end to the USIBWC’s excuses and incessant foot-dragging.  In 
the meantime, San Diego’s beaches will continue to be plagued by 
Tijuana’s sewage. 
ROSS CAMPBELL 
 
